Normative Narratives


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With Inflation Moderating in Most Sectors, the Fed Should Consider Pausing Rate Hikes

“All You Need Is Love”

Ask any kid what the necessities of life are, and they will come back with a short list including food, water, shelter, and love. As adults we also understand the importance of energy (gasoline and electricity) and money in attaining these needs, as well as the many “wants” of life.

These very necessities–food, energy, housing, and wages–are the current drivers of inflation. This stands in contrast to earlier in the pandemic recovery, when “supply chain issues” caused widespread inflation across consumer goods.

So why then, if these necessities are so important (in life and as current drivers of inflation), am I focusing on data excluding them when calling for a potential pause on rate hikes? Because their prices are less responsive to interest rates.

Most consumer prices are impacted by interest rates; as rates go up so do borrowing costs, putting downward pressure on demand and prices. Food and energy prices, however, are primarily determined on their global markets (which our interest rates have little impact on). Food and energy are also, as just noted, necessities, meaning demand is less responsive to price changes because people need them regardless of price (in economics-speak, their demand is “inelastic“). Interest rates are simply not a good mechanism for impacting food and energy prices.

Shelter is another necessity that has an interesting relationship with interest rates. As the Fed increases interest rates to combat inflation mortgage rates go up, pricing some people out of buying homes and into the rental market. Supply in the rental market is fixed in the short term (due to construction time), and slow to increase in the longer term (largely due to restrictive zoning laws). Increasing demand and fixed supply, combined with higher operating costs and the expiration of pandemic era renter protections, have recently led to large increases in rent. In other words, the Fed’s primary tool for combating inflation could actually be contributing to inflation in housing (peoples’ largest expense category regardless of income).

[Paul Krugman recently cited Jason Furman’s analysis claiming that rental prices are already moderating more than official BLS measures suggest, due to the Bureau’s methodology of tracking lease renewals in addition to newly signed leases. Newly signed leases, which in theory are more reflective of current market conditions than renewals, have been falling more steeply of late. These are two very smart people and their analysis is sound, hopefully it proves true and starts bearing out in official BLS rental indexes in the coming months.]

One Month Doesn’t Make a Trend

“Several Fed officials sought to temper investors’ enthusiasm, warning that there would need to be more evidence of slowing inflation before the Fed will let up on its campaign of rate increases.

‘It could easily go the other way in the next report, and I just don’t want to put too much weight on one month’s data,’ James Bullard, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, said on Thursday.”

That’s fair, one month’s data doesn’t make a trend. But prices for “core” goods, whose supply chain issues drove inflation earlier in the pandemic, have leveled off since June. Prices for services other than rent (the remainder of what could be considered the “core”, or interest rate responsive economy) were flat in October, but inflation in the services sector has been more persistent. The provision of services is more reliant on labor than goods production is, and labor costs were still rising as of the latest September data.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Total Factor Productivity

The Producer Price Index (PPI), which tracks prices received by producers and is considered a bellwether of future consumer price movements, has also shown inflation coalescing around food and energy for about four months.

Table B represents intermediate demand goods even further up the supply chain, suggesting continued disinflation / deflation ahead for goods.

There is an element of “reading the tea leaves” when trying to determine the future trajectory of inflation, so the Fed should make use of all the high quality “tea leaves” it has at its disposal. What they show are four months of producer price data reinforcing that the current slowdown in “core” consumer inflation is not an aberration and will likely continue. Four months does make a trend in our current fast-moving environment, and the Fed will have the benefit of two more months of data before the next interest rate setting (“FOMC”) meeting (as well December labor cost data). This will also give the Fed time to see if Furman is correct about moderation in rental markets.

In June 2021 I wrote that we should “Keep Calm and let the Fed Carry On”—asserting that the Fed is an independent, expert body that knows what it is doing. The Fed is still independent and full of experts, but these experts are human and therefore need to check their biases and not be overly risk averse. Every large-scale economic policy carries risks, but the risk of the Fed waiting on rate hikes seems negligible (inflation has moderated if not yet begun to reverse), while the downside of unnecessarily raising interest rates is very real–we could still be facing a recession, especially given uncertainties in the global economy. The higher the interest rate the greater the drag on the economy, so raising rates in the name of fighting inflation–if inflation continues to be driven by markets that are not responsive to interest rates–doesn’t make much sense.

The Fed must also avoid the common mistake of fighting the last war; after in hindsight not doing enough to combat inflation in 2021, it must resist the urge to overcorrect with unnecessarily aggressive rate hikes now. The “smooth landing” of disinflation without a painful recession we all hope for is within reach. I would argue we are currently on that path, and while factors outside America’s control could always derail us, hopefully an overly risk averse Fed does not.

Purposefully Misleading “Forward Guidance”?

My best explanation, or perhaps hope, for what I see as unnecessarily hawkish rhetoric from the Fed, is that it is using “forward guidance” in an unusual manner. “Forward guidance” is exactly what it sounds like: “a tool that central banks use to provide communication to the public about the likely future course of monetary policy.

Forward guidance is usually meant to be as straightforward as possible, but these are unusual times. The Fed may be trying to manifest the future we all want–the “smooth landing” of disinflation without a recession–by purposefully giving stricter guidance than it hopes to have to follow through on.

In other words, the Fed could be trying to impact peoples’ “inflationary expectations”. If people believe the Fed will act aggressively to keep inflation down, they may be less likely to buy more things or demand higher wages in anticipation of even higher future prices, pushing back on those sources of inflation. (It is commonly accepted by economists that inflationary expectations can have a self-fulfilling affect on future inflation rates.) As mentioned earlier, labor costs seem to be the most persistent driver of inflation that is (somewhat) in the Feds control right now, so managing inflationary expectations is a top priority for the Fed.

The Fed can always say one thing now while ultimately making policy based on not yet available data. I hope it is engaging in this tactical (and forgivable) misdirection, because if inflation continues on its current path, actually carrying out the rate hikes the Fed has been signaling would be poor policy. I am not advocating for reducing rates yet, but if two more months of encouraging consumer, producer, and labor price data come in, the Fed should pause rate hikes during the next FOMC meeting Feb 1st.


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Inflation: Keep Calm and Let the Fed Carry On

Anticipating concern over recent inflation numbers, the White House Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) put out a useful historic primer on recent periods of higher inflation:

“Supply chain disruptions are having a substantial impact on current economic conditions. Economy-wide and retail-sector inventory-to-sales ratios have hit record lows; homebuilders are reporting shortages of key materials; and automakers do not have enough semiconductors. Elevated consumer demand is adding fuel to the fire. Travel demand, for example, has returned much more sharply than expected, which is straining airline operations. Similarly, total vehicle sales in April more than doubled from a year prior, which is leading to empty dealer lots. The combination of a spike in consumer demand and a supply chain that is not fully operational has contributed to rising prices.

If actual inflation is affected by inflation expectations—and if expectations are in part formed by recent experiences (what economists call “adaptive” expectations)—then one risk is that transitory supply constraints and pent-up demand could have more persistent effects by raising longer-run expectations of inflation. On the other hand, businesses and consumers may “see through” supply disruptions and not change their longer-run expectations significantly.

In this blog post, we examine previous periods of heightened inflation and see what they can teach us about inflation in 2021…No single historical episode is a perfect template for current events. But when looking for historical parallels, it is useful to concentrate on inflationary episodes that contained supply chain disruptions and a spike in consumer demand after a period of temporary suppression. The inflationary period after World War II is likely a better comparison for the current economic situation than the 1970s and suggests that inflation could quickly decline once supply chains are fully online and pent-up demand levels off. The CEA will continue to carefully gauge the trajectory of inflation.”

How people expect prices to behave can actually affect price levels. If people think prices will continue to rise, and increase their purchases beyond what they normally would to hedge against expected future increases, that itself can lead to greater inflation. If you (as I) believe the forces of supply and demand will eventually even out any market mismatches, then expectations are arguably the “most variable” of the variables affecting inflation right now (at least in an advanced economy like America’s.)

One important difference today compared to earlier periods examined by the CEA is the hyper-partisan nature of all policy debates, and how that plays out in the news and ultimately affects peoples’ beliefs. When people are subjected to continuous fear-mongering about inflation it is likely to impact their expectations, leading to greater inflation than the underlying economics alone would have yielded. In our world of social-media fueled “echo chambers” and the confirmation bias it enables, psychological forces could play an outsized role in the levels of inflation we ultimately realize.

For what its worth–hopefully a lot–most economists believe current high inflation figures are partially due to the “base effect” (lower inflation in 2020 due to pandemic related shutdowns making over-the-year increases look larger than they otherwise would be) and will be “transitory” (shorter-term, subsiding once the effects of supply chain bottle necks and pent-up demand work themselves out.)

Monetary policy is one area where we should trust the experts; it is inherently complex, and there is good reason to think ideology won’t dominate. Why? Because inflation has the ability to hit peoples’ wealth and sense of financial security in ways that taxes cannot; regardless of your political affiliation, you probably have no interest in seeing your lifetime of hard earned savings inflated away due to mismanagement. So we have Fed Chief Jerome Powell (a Trump appointee) working closely with former Fed Chief Secretary Yellen (who was appointed to her various roles by Obama and Biden.) The two have historically had very different views on appropriate monetary policy, but as dedicated public servants with “skin in the game”, they both want to get monetary policy right.

There is also little reason to think the types of spending Biden is proposing would be particularly inflationary. The administration is actually framing its proposals as inflation reducing in the middle-to-long run. They argue that by investing in our infrastructure, human capital, and the burgeoning green economy, gains in productivity will allow businesses to pay higher wages and stay profitable without needing to drastically increases prices.

The spending in Democratic proposals would also be spread out over time, meaning any inflationary aspects (should they be felt before productivity boosts are realized), mainly occur after the transitory post-COVID pressures subsided. It would not be inflation on-top of what we are currently experiencing.

The Federal Reserve has the “dual mandate” of promoting price stability and full employment. In determining appropriate monetary policy, context matters—despite a growing economy and low interest rates, America has experienced lower-that-desired inflation (below the 2% annual target) for much of the past decade. This is another reason the historically hawkish Powell is comfortable letting inflation “run hot” for a little while in order to help return the labor market to full employment. This strategy, championed by the unsung hero of the Great Recession Ben Bernanke, is known as “temporary price level targeting“.

In other words, keep calm and let the Fed (and CEA) carry on. It knows what it is doing. It proved that during the Great Recession when it ignored these same disingenuous warnings and saved our economy, while conservatives fear-mongered about inflation and obstructed an adequate fiscal response in Congress. Sound familiar?

Fools, Fanatics, and Wiser People

“The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts.” — Bertrand Russel

I cannot tell you with certainty how long higher inflation will last–no one can. Uncertainty about how COVID variants will disrupt operations in countries with lower vaccination rates makes it difficult to predict exactly when global supply chains will normalize. The possibility that different components of the basket of goods that make up the topside inflation number may experience price increases at different points in time could also draw out this transitory period.

Even with those uncertainties, I can say with confidence that I think any higher-than-desired inflation will be transitory, and that the Fed has the tools to bring inflation down if need be. I can tell you there are real costs to people and our economy from unnecessarily tightening monetary policy too soon. I can also tell you that those who are saying with certainty that a sustained period of high inflation will (or already has) taken off–so called “Bidenflation”–have ulterior motives for doing so. They also have a terrible track record of predicting these sort of things; remember “Obamaflation“? Probably not, because it never actually materialized.

Most importantly, forgoing this historic opportunity to pass the biggest investment in America and its people since The New Deal in the name of sustained higher inflation that will likely never materialize, and if it does can be managed, would be the height of stupidity–the type of stupidity that would reverberate through history. Can you imagine America without The New Deal or Great Society (or the world for that matter, considering what their absence likely would have meant to the the Cold War effort?) No, you cannot–it is inconceivable. America again finds itself needing to prove democracy can work not only for its own people, but as part of a new “Cold War” against the forces of authoritarianism—the stakes for getting these things done could not be higher.

Senator Joe Manchin, the man who above anyone else needs to be convinced of this so these plans can be passed via reconciliation, recently said he is “going to talk to some economists” about the possible inflationary effects of these proposals. Look, if he wants to find economists to tell him to moderate due to inflationary concerns, he will find them. However those views would not represent the beliefs of most economists, and run counter to the lessons of recent history and the demands of the moment.

Most economists (like most subject matter experts), due to some combination of integrity and ego, actually care about being right. They agree the benefits of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy right now far outweigh the unlikely costs of runaway inflation. Recent history tells us we should not believe the people who fear-mongered about inflation during The Great Recession for the same regressive reasons they are today. Those opposed to Biden’s proposals believe if they can delay them long enough, they can kill them by flipping the balance of power in Congress back to the GOP. They are right, and that cannot be allowed to happen.

Ultimately the need to act now and adjust later comes down to how fiscal and monetary policy are passed. There is a small window to act on fiscal policy; when is the next time America will emerge from a such a crisis, with people demanding these sort of large scale investments, and with the party that is willing to pursue them controlling all the levers of federal policy-making? In the context of our grossly and increasingly uneven electoral playing field, probably not again in the foreseeable future. Monetary policy on the other hand, by virtue of being passed relatively smoothly by the independent Fed, is much more nimble and can be adjusted to meet any inflationary consequences of this spending should they ever come to pass.


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Economic Outlook: Quantitative Easing, Monetary Policy Coordination, and the IMF

I was going to write a  conflict watch about the chemical gas attack in Syria, but as different actors are aligning with their interest and using mostly circumstantial evidence (Russia / Assad Regime: rebels did it, why would we launch chem weapons while U.N inspectors here?; Opposition / Western governments: Assad did it, emboldened by lack of international intervention after previous chem attacks, Assad subsequently shelled area so time would pass, now UN inspectors cannot get reliable results), I will refrain from speculating on these troubling events until more information emerges.

Continuing the narrative that has come to the forefront since G-20 finance talks in Moscow and the focus surrounding extra-territorial consequences of loose monetary policy at the Fed’s annual Jackson Hole meeting, policy coordination between central banks and new policy responses by IMF are needed to ensure as smooth as possible a transition from Q.E. to Fed monetary policy tightening (exactly when this will occur is uncertain, I am of the mind that it will be later rather than sooner).

Original articles:

Reuters:

Central banks should coordinate to avoid unwanted side effects as they exit from ultra-easy monetary policies that have left the world awash in cheap money, top policymakers were told on Saturday.

“The main challenge will be to manage the consequences of monetary policies, and their evolutions, on cross-border liquidity movements,” Jean-Pierre Landau concluded in a paper he presented to an audience that included top central bankers from advanced as well as emerging market economies.

The Fed’s bond buying, or so-called quantitative easing, has been at the heart of its aggressive efforts to revive U.S. economic growth after it cut interest rates to nearly zero in 2008. Interest rates in Europe and Japan are also ultra-low.

However, the purchases have spurred massive capital inflows into faster growing emerging economies, which are now suffering as investors anticipate an end to the easy money.

But he lamented that the necessary coordination on monetary policy was unlikely, and warned of the potential for the “fragmentation” of global capital markets.

Stocks and currencies plunged in India, IndonesiaBrazil and Turkey this week as investors fretted over a looming reduction in the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monthly bond purchases.

Landau acknowledged that central bankers dislike the idea of coordinating monetary policy because their job is to focus on domestic goals. But they worked well together during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, when the Fed, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan and other central banks coordinated rate cuts and currency swap lines.

As cross-border liquidity pressures build, they will find it productive to do so again, although cooperation is more likely through regulatory and financial structures aimed at preventing excessive leverage or harmful asset bubbles, he said.

In an ideal world, the cooperation would extend to monetary policy because policies in major economies such as the United States can have an international impact that amplifies their magnitude with domestic implications, Landau argued.

“The system itself is producing more accommodative monetary conditions than warranted by the situation,” he said. “In a reverse environment, when monetary policies need tightening, the effects could be symmetrical and complicate the exit from non-conventional measures.”

In addition, much could be gained through an international “lender of last resort,” which would remove the motive for some nations to maintain massive foreign exchange reserves, he added.

“All countries have a common interest in finding ways to disconnect reserve accumulation from exchange-rate management,” Landau said. “The need for national reserves could be reduced if credible mechanisms exist to provide for the supply of official liquidity on a multilateral basis.”

Economix:

The stimulus campaigns of the Federal Reserve and the central banks of Europe and Japan, by depressing domestic interest rates, have helped to push trillions of dollars into developing markets in recent years.

The question of what central banks are supposed to do about it dominated the formal agenda here at the Kansas City Fed’s annual monetary policy conference.

The answers were surprisingly mellow. The rest of the world would like the Fed to explain its plans clearly, and then to travel slowly. Bankers from developing nations said they might need to impose some restrictions on the outflow of capital, but expressed little concern over the potential for serious economic disruptions.

Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, struck the same sanguine tone in a Friday speech, declaring that “Central banks handled entry well, and we see no reason why they should not handle exit equally well.”

She added that the fund – and by extension, the major economies – accepted that some developing countries might need to impose some financial controls. “In some circumstances, capital flow management measures have been useful,” she said.

This is not the way that policymakers used to talk. The big countries and the I.M.F. spent the last few decades pushing for the liberalization of financial markets. They argued that developing nations were creating their own problems by failing to take the painful steps necessary to moderate capital inflows, notably by allowing their currencies to appreciate. And they showed no tolerance for capital controls.

The argument for global monetary policy coordination– mainly that in today’s globalized world, where unfathomable amounts of money can and do flow at the click of a mouse, that a large countries monetary policy choices have a direct impact on other countries–has already been explored in depth.One of the most important developments in monetary policy over the last generation is the conclusion that central banks can increase the power of their actions by talking about their goals, thereby shaping the expectations of investors.” Managing expectations and policy coordination are logically related and present a synergy point for global monetary policy coherence. 

Central banks historically have served a dual mandate, to manage unemployment and inflation. A 3rd (secondary) mandate has emerged since the Great Recession; to manage the extra-territorial effects of monetary policy decisions.

Two other interesting points are raised in these articles; the issue of capital controls and flexible credit lines.

Capital Controls:

International  capital investments are necessary for helping least developed countries (LDCs) escape poverty traps / expedite their development process. However, the mobility and liquidity of capital in today’s digital and globalized age make capital flows intrinsically volatile–capital controls help temper this volatility. IMF managing director Christie Lagarde has endorsed the use of capital controls in certain instances, which represents a complete 180 from the IMFs “Washington Consensus” policies of the 1980s and 90s. When money is “cheap” (as it is now), it flows to places that offer a higher rate of return (i.e. developing countries). Capital controls provide a buffer from capital flight when monetary policy tightens (which is inevitably as the global economy recovers), which can otherwise have devastating standard of living / human rights implications.

Capital flight may lead to less investment / higher “risk premium” (investors will not like the idea of not having complete control over their investment), but it is surely should be a countries own decision what investments it allows in its country and under what conditions, considering the destabilizing nature of unchecked financial inflows. If speculative money does not wish to come into a country, that may be in that countries best long term interests anyways. The failure of “Washington Consensus” policies, culminating in global financial contagion during the Great Recession, has led the international financial community (headed by the IMF) to reverse it’s previous stance on capital controls.

Flexible Credit Lines:

Jean Pierre-Landau alluded to flexible credit lines with this comment;

In addition, much could be gained through an international “lender of last resort,” which would remove the motive for some nations to maintain massive foreign exchange reserves, he added.

“All countries have a common interest in finding ways to disconnect reserve accumulation from exchange-rate management,” Landau said. “The need for national reserves could be reduced if credible mechanisms exist to provide for the supply of official liquidity on a multilateral basis.”

Flexible Credit Lines are available to countries through the IMF if they meet certain preconditions (a shift by the IMF from imposing constitutionality on loans to having countries reach certain thresholds for eligibility, but after that providing assistance without conditions that can sometimes undermine development (see “Washington Consensus”). Countries gain access to funding by the IMF at an agreed upon rate (which is fairly low). By having this IMF insurance policies, countries are able to pursue policies in their best long-term interests (for example capital controls, or fiscal investments in public goods), as opposed to the short-term interests of speculative investors.

The existence of a FCL eases concerns of financial actors. The overall experience with FCL countries (to date Mexico, Columbia, and Poland, evidence suggests that Ireland will be next) has been overwhelmingly positive. These countries have been able to borrow at a lower risk premium without ever having to access FCL money–no FCL country has ever had to draw on FCL funds. The efficacy of FCLs is only amplified against the backdrop of the European Debt Crisis.

I am a strong advocate of both FCLs and capital controls for developing countries. Both policies are fully consistent with a human rights based approach to sustainable human development. Both policies can temper the destabilizing effects of capital inflows, giving governments the capital, policy, and fiscal space needed to respond to crisis situations. It is encouraging to see high level policy makers are of the same mind when it comes to monetary policy coordination, FCLs, and capital controls.

I invite my readers to view a PPT presentation (FCL Final) I did last year on FCLs. The study shows graphically the experiences of Mexico, Columbia and Poland before, during, and after the Great Recession (these three countries all performed very well compared to comparable countries). It concludes by arguing for “scaling-up” of FCLs by offering them to more countries as a potential development tool.

 


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Economic Outlook: Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and the Zero Bound

Paul Krugman does a nice job of explaining why unprecedented monetary expansion (“quantitative easing”) has not really moved the needle in terms of reducing unemployment and increasing aggregate demand.

It would be prudent to remind the reader that there has been very little counterfactual analysis of the Feds policies since the Great Recession began (that I am aware of). The situation would almost certainly be worse, higher unemployment and deflation, had the Fed failed to act in the way it is. If you would like to read further on the downward spiral of debt, austerity and deflation in a depressed economy, Irving Fischer wrote on the subject following the Great Depression in a way that is both easy to understand and still as relevant today (perhaps even more-so given how much less politically charged expansionary monetary policy is post-gold standard).

A liquidity trap is a situation when slashing interest rates on government bonds to near zero percent is insufficient to provide enough credit to allow the economy to produce at full productive capacity. Investors would rather invest in safe government assets with almost no yield then invest in private markets.

I believe a liquidity trap is in itself justification for expansionary fiscal policy. It is basically investors saying to the government, “here, we don’t want to invest our money, so do it for us and just promise to pay us back in the future, don’t even worry about the interest”. But fiscal policy, which originates in the House of Representatives, is politically charged (especially when a government is already highly indebted, then every spending program comes under close scrutiny).

Monetary policy, on the other hand, is much more politically isolated. It originates within the Federal Reserve, which is staffed with economists who understand economics better than politicians. The Fed began by cutting rates, hoping to stimulate aggregate demand.

Once this conventional monetary policy failed, unconventional means were taken; the Fed is buying assets on a large scale, expanding the monetary base. The Fed has pledged to continue to pursue expansionary monetary policy by buying assets on a monthly basis until either the unemployment rate falls below a certain level (I believe 6.5%) or inflation rises above a certain level (I believe 2%).

The Fed made this announcement to try to change people’s expectations. Since you cannot cut nominal interest rates below zero percent (the “Zero Lower Bound”), the Fed hopes to stimulate demand by making people think that in the future inflation will be higher than it is now. If money is worth less in the future, then people will want to spend it now while it is worth more. More spending stimulates the economy and reduces unemployment.

So why has this policy been ineffective? Well, as I said before, I am not so sure it has been—certainly the situation would be worse right now, not only for America but for the rest of the world which overwhelmingly relies on dollars for international transactions.

But as to why expansionary fiscal policy would be unquestionably more effective, Professor Krugman hits the nail on the head:

“I’m not claiming that there is nothing the central bank can do; but as I’ve tried to explain before, monetary policy can, for the most part, gain traction under current circumstances only by changing expectations about future actions (and changing them a lot). Meanwhile, fiscal policy has a direct, current effect on the economy, which easily trumps attempts to move the economy by changing the Fed’s messaging.

Sorry, guys, but as a practical matter the Fed – while it should be doing more – can’t make up for contractionary fiscal policy in the face of a depressed economy.”

Think of beginners national income accounting, where aggregate demand (Y) = C (consumption) + I (investment) + G (government spending).

Fiscal policy can stimulate AD directly by increasing either G, C, or I depending on how the program is designed.  Monetary Policy, on the other hand, has a much less direct effect. It tries to incentivize people to act a certain way (increase C or I), but people do not always act “rationally” in the economic sense. Sometimes people are so risk averse that even reducing the yield on an investment does not reduce the demand for this investment (particularly in times of economic uncertainty, when I would argue investors tend to become more risk averse).

Also, there is inherently less scrutiny in exactly how monetary policy works. While it is true that some portion of fiscal expansion may be used inefficiently, it is much more tractable than monetary policy.

Monetary policy stimulates AD, but it can also feed into financial bubbles. By providing low interest loans to banks, the Fed is making a leap of faith that the money will be spent wisely. The money should be going to helping people restructure underwater mortgages, or generally providing low cost financing, freeing money for people to spend and stimulate demand. And to a certain extent it is does, but it can just as easily be spent in other less egalitarian ways. If this money goes to Wall St.  investments, the gains will be realized almost entirely by the wealthy.

Evidence exists that this is happening—unemployment remains stuck while financial markets have reached record highs. Securitization, which became taboo after the financial crisis hit, has began to become common practice again. Without meaningful financial reform, the Feds policies could be fueling the next asset bubble.

The Fed has maintained it is keeping a close watch on how its money is being spent, and given the suffering caused by the Great Recession I’m sure it is, but there is only so much it can do. The Fed cannot possibly micromanage how all of its “cheap money” is being spent. The Fed could try to only lend to more people-friendly institutions, such as “credit unions”, or establish mechanisms to lend directly to people and small businesses, but up until this point has either has not or cannot do so (either due to its mandate or due to insufficient manpower for such oversight).

So expansionary monetary policy has kept the recovery from not being worse than it is (or not being a recovery at all), but it has predictably fallen short of its intended goal. It needs to be complimented by expansionary fiscal policy. That’s not to say that there are no inefficient programs that can be made to more efficient–there almost assuredly are. The stimulus-advocate policymaker should have concrete examples of how resources can be used more effectively, if he has any hopes of convincing his austerity minded counterpart of coming to an agreement. Policy, like markets, requires both competition and coordination to be made as efficient as possible.

The Fed should not reverse course now, but should ensure proper oversight for its policies. The Federal government, on the other hand, seems to be slowly moving from austerity to stimulus. Will common sense and text-book macroeconomics prevail, or will business as usual continue? Only time will tell.

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