Tsipras | Normative Narratives

The terms of the 3rd bailout deal between Greece and its creditors brought a lot of issues to the forefront.

Silly me for thinking negotiations had to with economics–modernizing the Greek economy by enacting needed structural reforms, while providing the Greek government with the fiscal space needed to promote growth and address it’s pressing humanitarian crisis (which said structural reforms would only exacerbate in the short run). Instead, the defining elements of the deal were related to personality and politics.

The Germans were mad at the Greeks, so much so that German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble said perhaps Greece might be better off leaving the Euro–this short-sighted self interest is not suitable behavior for Europe’s de facto leader. Tsipras’s government, for it’s part, apparently did not have a backup plan in case it’s creditors failed to offer a reasonable deal. I know Syriza is new to politics, but you don’t have to be a master negotiator to know that going into negotiations without a backup plan is a flawed strategy.

I was a fan of Tsipras’s government because of the interim agreement it secured in February–the potential for trading structural reforms for fiscal space. But since that point it terribly misplayed its hand. It went into negotiations without a backup plan. It held a referendum at least a month too late–the overwhelming “no” vote would have been a strong bargaining chip had Greece been able to take it back to the negotiating table while still covered under the terms of its prior bailout.

But once those terms expired, and Greek banks closed, the only choices for Greece were Grexit or capitulation. Since there was no plan in place for a Grexit, Greece ended up with the terrible deal it got. That deal–as it currently stands–fails in all regards: financial sustainability, growth prospects, and short term humanitarian concerns.

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Not Financially Viable:

The International Monetary Fund threatened to withdraw support for Greece’s bailout on Tuesday unless European leaders agree to substantial debt relief, an immediate challenge to the region’s plan to rescue the country.

A new rescue program for Greece “would have to meet our criteria,” a senior I.M.F. official told reporters on Tuesday, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “One of those criteria is debt sustainability.”

The I.M.F. is now firmly siding with Greece on the issue. In a reportreleased publicly on Tuesday, the fund proposed that creditors let Athens write off part of its huge eurozone debt or at least make no payments for 30 years.

The I.M.F. said in its report that a write-down could be avoided, but only if creditors extended the schedule for Greece to repay its debt. The only other alternative to a haircut would be for the eurozone countries to give Greece the money it needs to repay them.

“The choice between the various options is for Greece and its European partners to decide,” the I.M.F. report said.

Greece would need to spend a sum equal to more than 15 percent of G.D.P. annually to pay interest and principal on its debt, according to the latest I.M.F. report.

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Does Not Fulfill Greek’s Human Rights:

The implementation of new austerity measures in Greece amid the country’s deteriorating economic crisis must not come at a cost to human rights, a United Nations expert warned today as he urged international institutions and the Greek Government to make “fully informed decisions” before adopting additional reforms.

“I am seriously concerned about voices saying that Greece is in a humanitarian crisis with shortages in medicines and food,” Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, the UN Independent Expert on foreign debt and human rights, stressed in a press statement today. “Priority should be to ensure that everybody in Greece has access to core minimum levels of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health care, food and social security.”

“A debt service burden that may be sustainable from a narrow financial perspective may not be viable at all if one considers the comprehensive concept of sustainable development, which includes the protection of the environment, human rights and social development,” he added.

And of course, as the IMF report highlights, the deal is not even “sustainable from a narrow financial perspective”.

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Kicking the Can or Letting Heads Cool?

If Greece’s creditors, led by Germany, ultimately want to see Greece stay in the Eurozone (for the long run), a friendlier deal is needed. If a “Grexit”, with its short term pain but long term possibilities to return Greece to economic health, is indeed in Greece’s best option given what it’s creditors are willing to offer, why not take that tough medicine and let the healing start? The current deal represents the worst of both worlds–economic pain now and a likely Grexit in the future.

The one positive of this deal is that it did buy time, which should not be undervalued as “Grexit” would be permanent and have terrible geopolitical consequences. But without stimulus (there are talks of a 35 billion euro stimulus fund by 2020 if reforms are fully implemented, but this may be too little too late) and debt restructuring (which cannot be ruled out, but also cannot be counted on), the deal is little more than kicking the can down the road–all while the Greek people continue to suffer.

Greece’s creditors cannot keep dangling future carrots while imposing fiscal restraints which hurt Greece’s already beleaguered citizenry in the here and now. Aid must be synced with structural reforms, or else the Greeks will see their situation go from terrible to worse and reject the terms of this 3rd bailout.

Doing the same thing and expecting different results is the definition of insanity. Greece has tried to implement reforms in order to unlock future aid before, and we see where that got it--a severely contracted economy, depression level unemployment rates, and costly political instability.

This is not the time for more business as usual; this is the time for bold action and trust between Greece and it’s creditors. Unfortunately nothing about the past few months of negotiations suggest this is outcome will be realized.

To Grexit, or not to Grexit?

Greece’s negotiations with its creditors have not gone smoothly. The Greek government treated an interim deal reached in February as a starting point for negotiations, while it’s creditors considered it more of an non-negotiable outline of a deal. The result has been two sides talking past each other; the longer this situation persists, the more likely a “Grexit”–Greece leaving the Eurozone and / or EU–becomes.

There is a ton of middle ground for the two sides–both want Greece to return to growth and full employment. The Greek government also wants a safety-net for people negatively affected by labor market and other structural reforms; pushing already impoverished people further into poverty is not only morally reprehensible, it is bad economics.

To prevent this result, Greece has passed an “anti-poverty law” to protect its most vulnerable citizens. The problem is financing this program; the Greek government needs room to implement needed structural reforms without further destabilizing Greek society.

In addition to staving off a humanitarian crisis, Greece also needs a long-term growth strategy beyond structural reforms. There are few options for the Greek government:

1) It can completely comply with creditor demands.

2) It can continue to push its lenders for more fiscal space (smaller primary surplus and / or promises of greater EU level aid / debt relief).

Or,

3) It can default on its debts and exit the Eurozone.

The first option is a non-starter, as the Greek government feels current demands would exacerbate social and economic hardship in Greece.

The second option would allow Greece to leverage more public money for safety net programs, educational and workforce training programs, and public private partnerships. This would allow Greece to avoiding default while mapping out a plan to boost economic growth.

The last option would be painful in the short-run as Greece would get battered by financial markets and possibly have to deal with currency instability as it reintroduced the drachma(?), but it would open policy space and make Greece much more competitive in terms of cost of doing business. A Grexit could also lead to a domino effect–if other ailing E.U. countries see a post-E.U. Greece succeeding, it would bolster anti-E.U. parties within these countries.

It is obvious that the second choice is in everyone’s best interests. Unfortunately, that is no guarantee this route will be taken:

Herman van Rompuy [former head of the European Council of EU leaders] told a Brussels conference that if Greece were to leave the euro zone, that would also have geopolitical repercussions in the current standoff with Russiaover Ukraine, emboldening Moscow to see Europe as weak.

Van Rompuy urged all sides to consider the political and geopolitical implications of such a step and not just the economic and financial arguments.

“I hope we will never have to answer the Grexit question,” he added

Greece staying in the E.U. is important for both sides of the negotiation. There are enough crises in the world without manufacturing one in Greece. It is exactly times like these when budgetary restrictions should be relaxed in the name of pragmatic, longer-term priorities. But so far Greece and it’s lenders have been unable to map out a solution that worksall parties involved, and so the current impasse and possibility of an “accidental Grexit” persists.

Greece did submit a new proposal to it’s creditors yesterday, and it was apparently strong enough that it got an unofficial endorsement from French Prime Minister Francois Hollande. This could be meaningful development, as heads of major European states have to this point been reluctant to acknowledge Greek concessions. It is a step towards the “political dialogue” Tsipras has been pleading for (framing the debate less in adversarial terms between debtor and creditor, and more as a mutual compromise between equal partners working towards a common goal).

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“Democracy in Recession”

If Greece were to leave the EU, (aside from the economic impact) there would be significant geopolitical repercussions, including a Greek pivot towards Russia. The Greek government has already signaled it disagrees with EU sanctions on Russia. More recently, it was reported that Putin and Tsipras “did not discuss financial aid” on the sidelines of the St. Peteresburg International Economic Forum. Generally speaking, whenever someone has to defend that something “wasn’t discussed”, it means it either was discussed or very likely will be in the future.

This is not to say that Greece would stop being functioning as a democracy if it leaves the EU. In fact, it is a strong belief in democratic ideals that underpin the current standoff between Greece and it’s creditors. But a fracturing of the EU would certainly be a blow to the ideals the EU stands for–peace and prosperity through a cooperative, democratic international system. Specifically, if Greece signed a natural gas pipeline deal with Russia, it would undermine the current sanctions regime against Russia.

Even more alarmingly, Greece’s problems are emblematic of a greater inward shift by major democratic powers:

A recent NATO Poll found that “At least half of Germans, French and Italians say their country should not use military force to defend a NATO ally if attacked by Russia,” the Pew Research Center said it found in its survey, which is based on interviews in 10 nations.

In the United States, the study notes, support for NATO remains fairly strong. Americans and Canadians, it says, were the only nationalities surveyed in which more than half of those polled believed that their country should take military action if Russia attacked a NATO ally.

This is further evidence of a worrying global trend, what Thomas Friedman calls “Democracy in recession”:

“…perhaps the most worrisome dimension of the democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence” in America and the West at large. After years of hyperpolarization, deadlock and corruption through campaign financing, the world’s leading democracy is increasingly dysfunctional, with government shutdowns and the inability to pass something as basic as a budget. “The world takes note of all this,” says Diamond. “Authoritarian state media gleefully publicize these travails of American democracy in order to discredit democracy in general and immunize authoritarian rule against U.S. pressure.”

Diamond urges democrats not to lose faith. Democracy, as Churchill noted, is still the worst form of government — except for all the others. And it still fires the imagination of people like no other system. But that will only stay true if the big democracies maintain a model worth following. I wish that were not so much in question today.

Look, I get it. The world is still emerging from a generational economic crisis. Democracies are first and foremost accountable to their electorates, and in the face of short-term problems it is difficult to sell the importance of dealing with seemingly longer-term issues. But this is what we should demand of our political leaders–the ability to meet peoples short term needs while simultaneously laying the groundwork for long-term peace and prosperity.

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The Democratization Process

Modernization theory and recent history support the idea that sustained democratic movements must result from organic desire by local factions. When these natural movements towards democratic governance emerge, they must be nurtured.

Democratic movements are always opposed by those who stand to lose power should they succeed. If the primary champions of democracy (the U.S. and the E.U.) seem increasingly unwilling to provide the resources needed to defend those who share our values, democratic movements are less likely to take shape against adversaries that tend to have economic and military advantages.

Autocratic rulers have always used propoganda and media control to make democracy look less appealing. This job becomes easier when traditional democratic stalwarts appear unable to govern effectively at home, and unwilling to defend their ideals abroad.