Normative Narratives


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Conflict Watch: Ghosts of Egypt’s Past, Present, and Future

Quick historic background on the Muslim Brotherhood

The NYT has an excellent interactive timeline of events Egypt from the resignation of former President Mubarak–present day.

Last night I stayed up until 2:30 am to watch the UNDP Oslo Group / FAFO conversation on Egypt’s immediate future. Silly me, as I could have just streamed it today.

Today I will focus primarily on major events since the Mubarak ouster (credit to the NYT), and insights from the conversation last night. It is also helpful to brush up on some of the basic historic power-dynamics of Egypt’s current major political players.

Mubarak Steps Down

Feb. 11, 2011

David Kirkpatrick and Anthony Shadid report from Cairo on the aftermath of President Mubarak’s resignation.Zena Barakat

Vice President Omar Suleiman announces that President Hosni Mubarak, 82, has turned over all power to the military, passed all authority to a council of military leaders and named his prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, to lead the cabinet.

The announcement, which comes after an 18-day revolt led by the young people of Egypt, shatters three decades of political stasis and overturns the established order of the Arab world.

Egypt’s Military Extends Its Power

June 15, 2012

Protesters gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo as Egypt’s military rulers moved to consolidate power on Friday, the eve of the Egyptian presidential runoff election. The day before, the Supreme Constitutional Court moved to shut down the Islamist-led Parliament, locking out lawmakers and seizing the sole right to issue laws.Adam Ferguson for The New York Times

Egypt’s military rulers move to consolidate power on the eve of the presidential runoff election between Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ahmed Shafik, a former prime minister to Mr. Mubarak. They shut down the Islamist-led Parliament, predicated on acourt ruling a day before, and seize the sole right to issue laws even after a new head of state takes office. Their charter gives them control of all laws and the national budget, immunity from any oversight and the power to veto a declaration of war.

The military counsel also issues an interim constitution, all but eliminating the president’s authority in an apparent effort to guard against a victory by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mohamed Morsi of Brotherhood Sworn In as President

June 30, 2012
President-elect Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood spoke to hundreds of thousands of supporters in Tahrir Square. Tomas Munita for The New York Times

Mr. Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, is the winner of Egypt’s first competitive presidential election, handing the Islamists both a symbolic triumph and a potent weapon in their struggle for power against the country’s top generals.

Mr. Morsi, 60, an American-trained engineer and former lawmaker, is the first Islamist elected as head of an Arab state. He becomes Egypt’s fifth president and the first from outside the military. But his victory is an ambiguous milestone in Egypt’s promised transition to democracy.

Military and President Escalate Their Power Struggle

July 2012

Graffiti in Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo, the epicenter of antigovernment protests that led to the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, depicts members of the former government. From right are Mr. Mubarak; Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces who had acted as head of state until last week and will maintain the title of defense minister; Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister and presidential candidate; and the former general and presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik. Tomas Munita for The New York Times
The battle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military intensifies when Mr. Morsi summons back into session the democratically elected Parliament that the generals had dissolved after a hurried court ruling. Egypt’s highest court and generals dismiss the order, but Parliament meets in defiance and votes to appeal the court’s decision, creating a chaotic mess of conflicting legal authorities and jurisdictions.

The power struggle reflects dueling claims to Egypt’s emerging politics, with each side trying to frame the debate as a contest for ideals, legitimacy and democracy.

Morsi Seizes New Power

Nov. 22, 2012
Supporters hail President Mohamed Morsi’s move to take new power and retry his predecessor.Mohamed Abd El Ghany/Reuters

With a constitutional assembly on the brink of collapse and protesters battling the police in the streets over the slow pace of change, President Mohamed Morsi issues a decree granting himself broad powers above any court as the guardian of Egypt’s revolution and uses his new authority to order the retrial of Hosni Mubarak.

The unexpected breadth of the powers he seizes raises immediate fears that he might become a new strongman.

Nov. 29, 2012

Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite Objections

The Islamists drafting Egypt’s new constitution vote to approve a charter that human rights groups and international experts say is full of holes and ambiguities. The result will fulfill some of the central demands of the revolution. But it will also give the generals much of the power and privilege they had during the Mubarak era and will reject the demands of ultraconservative Salafis.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands fill Tahrir Square to protest Mr. Morsi’s expansive new powers.

Egypt Struggles to Revive Ailing Economy

March 2013
Egyptians in a gas line in the city of Luxor. Tara Todras-Whitehill for The New York Times

A fuel shortage has helped send food prices soaring. Electricity is blacking out even before the summer. And Egypt is struggling to pay the billions of dollars it owes foreign oil companies.

For months, the government has been negotiating a $4.8 billion loan on fairly easy terms from the International Monetary Fund. The thinking is that if the I.M.F. approved a loan, it could give the government the credibility it needs to unlock billions more dollars in aid and loans. But if a deal is reached, it will probably mean reducing subsidies for energy — a step many fear will incite the public.

In April, Egypt presses to increase the loan size, but discussions are pending and won’t start again until October.

July 3, 2013

Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Denounces ‘Military Coup’

In an announcement read on state television, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, the Egyptian defense minister, ousts Mr. Morsi, the nation’s first freely elected president, suspending the Constitution, installing an interim government and insisting it was responding to the millions of Egyptians who had opposed the Islamist agenda of Mr. Morsi and his allies in the Muslim Brotherhood.

The military intervention, which Mr. Morsi rejects, raises questions about whether the 2011 revolution will fulfill its promise to build a new democracy at the heart of the Arab world.

Dozens of Morsi Supporters Are Killed in Cairo Protest

July 8, 2013

Supporters of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s ousted Islamist president, demonstrated outside the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in Cairo on Monday.Yusuf Sayman for The New York Times

Soldiers and police officers open fire on hundreds of supporters of Mr. Morsi outside the facility where he is believed to be detained, killing at least 54 people and wounding more than 300.

A military spokesman, contradicting dozens of witnesses who say the attack had been unprovoked, says the violence had started when Brotherhood members attacked the officers’ club of the Republican Guard.

It is the single deadliest episode of violence since the final days before Mr. Mubarak’s ouster.

Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi

July 10, 2013
Relatives of Christians killed near Luxor, where Muslim mobs invaded Christian homes and set them alight while besieging other Christians in their homes.Ibrahim Zayed/Associated Press 

The sudden end of crippling energy shortages and the re-emergence of the police suggest that those opposed to Mr. Morsi had tried to undermine his administration.

The new military-led government accuses Mr. Morsi and his allies in the Muslim Brotherhood of a campaign to incite violence before and after his ouster as president.

July 16, 2013

Egypt’s New Government Doesn’t Include Muslim Brotherhood

Muslim Brotherhood supporters tried to block the Six October Bridge in Cairo during demonstrations Monday into Tuesday morning.Mahmoud Khaled/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Adli Mansour, Egypt’s interim president, swears in a new cabinet that is dominated by liberal and leftist politicians. Not one of the 34 cabinet members belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood or to any other Islamist party. The cabinet does include three women and three Coptic Christians, making it slightly more diverse, in some respects, than Mr. Morsi’s cabinet.

Crackdown in Egypt Kills Islamists as They Protest

July 27, 2013

This was the second mass killing of demonstrators in three weeks.Mohamed Abd El Ghany/Reuters

The Egyptian authorities unleash a ferocious attack on Islamist protesters, killing at least 72 people in the second mass killing of demonstrators in three weeks and the deadliest attack by the security services since Egypt’s uprising in early 2011.

The tactics — many were killed with gunshot wounds to the head or the chest — suggest that Egypt’s security services felt no need to show any restraint.

Egyptian Forces Storm Pro-Morsi Sit-Ins

Yesterday (Aug 14)

Supporters of the ousted president, Mohamed Morsi, tended to the wounded near the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in the Nasr City district of Cairo.Narciso Contreras for The New York Times

Security forces launch a bloody crackdown on two sit-ins by supporters of Mr. Morsi, setting off waves of violence in the capital and across the country. More than 500 are killed and 3,700 people injured in the the bloodiest day since Mr. Mubarak’s ouster. Muslim Brotherhood supporters urge followers to take to the streets the next day.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the interim vice president and a Nobel Prize-winning former diplomat, resigns in protest, as General Sisi declares a one-month state emergency.

(Again big thanks to the NYT for putting together such an extensive timeline)

Since my most recent post about the crisis in Egypt, things have taken a decidedly ominous turn. Here’s an excerpt from my post two weeks ago:

Is Egypt spiraling into or out of control? I suppose the answer you receive to that question would depend on who you ask. Ask a Morsi opponent, and he will tell you that the Morsi regime was little more than an illegitimate power-grab. Ask a Morsi supporter and they will tell you Morsi’s failures were due to the “deep state” (military, police, judiciary) and a refusal of his opponents to embrace the democratic process, undermining his rule.

So instead lets look at the indisputable facts. Sectarian divides are stronger now than they were when Mubarak fell–did the coup avert a civil war, or lay the foundation for civil conflict? Human rights are not being upheld in an indiscriminate way, as anybody that supports Morsi may be silenced with impunity by the military (either by having media outlets shut down / being arrested / or killed). A larger budget deficit is all but certain for Egypt’s next democratically elected government.

In Egypt, as long as the army has a popular mandate (or what it deems a popular mandate), it can act with impunity. Human rights violations, unsustainable fiscal policy and government deficits, media censorship, and lack of accountability from the military are week pillars to build democracy on.

Having said all this, there does seem to be a legitimacy with the new Egyptian coalition government; it has said all the right things and seems to back the will of Egypt’s pluralistic civil society. But actions speak louder than words, and the actions of Egypt’s military and interim government–combined with The Muslim Brotherhoods determination to play spoiler in Egypt’s second attempt at democratization–does not bode well for the implementation of Egypts “road-map to democracy”.

Even I, who was pessimistic about the implications of the coup for political Islam and democracy since the beginning, did not foresee the military misplaying it’s hand as catastrophically as it has. And again, as always, time has answered many questions that a few weeks ago were a mystery.

The Military has shown it’s true colors. Mass killings, media censorship, and a further grip on power have defined the so called “road-map to democracy”. The interim government was formed without a single MB member, while military loyalists assumed many top positions. VP Mohamed ElBaradei, a former UN negotiator, Nobel Prize winner, and bastion of legitimacy for the interim governments, resigned from his position in dissent of the army’s actions. Experts expect further resignations in the coming days and weeks. 19 / 27 provincial governors appointed were ex-military (for comparison sake, 11/27 appointed under Morsi were from the MB).  The police have come back essentially as another arm of the military. The state media has become an anti-Morsi propaganda engine, (even more-so than it was during Morsi’s rule)

The fact of the matter is that, regardless of how much of a power grab the MB made during Morsi’s brief time in Presidency, it pails in comparison to the power grab the military has staged for the last half a century. The military cemented it’s rule prior to Morsi’s election, via confirmation from a Mubarak era judge, fueling speculation that the “deep state” never truly gave up power. For all we know, Mubarak is living in the lap of luxury; his resignation a calculated move to win popular support for the military in order to further sustain it’s nontransparent, undemocratic rule. OK, maybe I am getting a little ahead of myself, but at this point no revelation would surprise me.

The Egyptian army is concerned only with self preservation–everybody else is dispensable. The military has little reason to care for the people; as long as it can continue to finance it’s operations, the productive capacity of society is a distant secondary concern. It was willing to let Morsi rule, until it seemed that the MB could become so powerful that it would be able to hold the military to account. Seizing on popular dissent, the army removed the MB “threat” as part of a “mandate of the people”. Very soon, if not already, liberal Egyptians will come to realize their revolution was hijacked not by Morsi, but by Sisi. 

Democratic gains made during the revolution have been reversed since the coup. Political and civil rights and freedoms, including rights of self-expression and assembly, no longer exist. Media liberalization has been reversed. The economy continues to collapse, while the military only exacerbates the problem by borrowing more, creating more debt and larger future cutbacks for whoever ends up ruling Egypt. The sectarian divide is deeper than ever, putting Egypt on the verge of civil war. It is interesting to note the rule the Salifi movement  has played in Egypt’s ongoing political chaos. A historically conservative group, it has emerged as an even handed, pluralistic, pragmatic, and centrist force in Egyptian politics. Of course it remains to be seen how the movement reacts to the most recent massacre of the MB. Consolidation of Islamic forces between the MB and Al Nour would make Civil War that much more likely.   

Egypt is bleeding, literally and figuratively. The ghosts of authoritarian regimes past have reared their ugly heads–Sisi yesterday imposed a month-long “state of emergency”, further exonerating his forces from any wrongdoing. Just like in the past, the MB is being excluded from politics and driven to the margins of society, where their human rights can be violated with impunity. The ghosts of the present are the people currently being massacred in an attempt to “restore order” to Egypt. The ghosts of the future may be casualties from a future Egyptian Civil War, or perhaps they will be ghosts of westerners, as the jihad movement seizes on the coup as a way to recruit disenfranchised young Muslims.

I can no longer find any reason to be optimistic about Egypt’s democratic transition. It seems that the army did not fully think the coup through by underestimating the resolve of the MB; after 3 separate massacres totaling close to 700 MB deaths, a prolonged civil conflict–if not an all out civil war–seems almost unavoidable at this point. Far from a “road map to democracy”, it seems Egypt’s military is steering the country down the Highway to Hell.


If you have made it this far, and want more insight, take a look at my notes from last nights conversation on Egypt’s current and future prospects.

FAFO_UNDP_Egyptnotes

Two general lessons from this talk.

1) The situation is still very fluid and there impossible to predict (but it wont stop me from hypothesizing!) 

2) Both the Egyptian military and the MB are running parallel and conflicting propaganda campaigns. It is very difficult to get a straightforward account of what is going on on the ground. Every movement has conservative, moderate, and liberal components. Things are not as black and white as they appear.

I am admittedly not always impartial here, that is not what Normative Narratives is about. When I take a stance here at NN, I am speaking in the aggregate; there will always be individual examples that run counter to my arguments. I take information from the most transparent sources I know (mainly the NYT and Reuters), and combined with my education experience and knowledge of history (which is of course not all-knowing), come up with what I believe are reasonable conclusions. Sometimes I am wrong, sometimes I am right, but I will never not have an educated opinion on a matter I find important.

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Initial Reactions to the Egyptian Military Coup D’etat

Looking Back:

Make no mistake about it, actions taken today by the Egyptian military represented a coup; Morsi was elected democratically and passed his constitution democratically. A military removing a democratically elected leader is a coup, regardless of how you spin it. At no point in the last year has there been any legitimate claims of unfair election / voting processes in Egypt. The only thing Morsi’s opposition can muster a majority over is, apparently, their dislike of Morsi.

Morsi’s year as President was marked by continued refusal by the opposition to take part in the democratic process. He was by no means a perfect leader, his rule was marked with civil and human rights violations as he struggled to keep at bay a power-grab by his long suppressed supporters while also upholding the responsibilities of running a pluralistic democratic society.

In addition to sectarian divides, the economic aftermath of the Mubarak ouster plagued the Morsi regime. Popular subsidies had to be cut in order to unlock international aid after the economy collapsed. Political divisions made such measures impossible to pass, and further economic degradation only reinforced divisions amongst Egyptians, leading to a degenerative cycle of poverty, insecurity, and political division.

No one will invest money, be it the IMF or General Electric, if a country is so divided that the ruling party and the opposition cannot even sit down together a come to agreements on policies with significant and immediate human rights and economic development implications. And certainly no family is going on a vacation to a country where their livelihood could constantly be in danger. As a result, Egypt’s foreign reserves dwindled, leading to inflation and a further deterioration of the Egyptian standard of living. 

General Asis, by giving Morsi a 48 hour period to negotiate, had already made up its mind about overthrowing Egypt’s first democratically elected leader. 48 hours is not enough time to make meaningful progress on negotiations— all such an unrealistic time frame did was further entrench the opposition’s position to refuse to come to the negotiating table.

Give Morsi 6 months or a year, an amount of time that allow the opposition to prove its legitimacy, other than stand on its head and watch fireworks and light shows. So far all the opposition has shown is extreme, borderline irrational hatred for Morsi and the inability to participate in the democratic process. Why should we believe that now democracy will work in Egypt?

The Military missed a golden opportunity to play arbiter between Morsi and the opposition, upholding both the principles of democratic institutions while also ensuring an inclusive agenda setting and policy making process consistent with international human rights norms. Instead the coup undermines the very ability of democracy to take root in Egypt, and creates far more questions than provides answers.

I sure hope I am wrong about the precedent being set in Egypt.

Looking Forward:

“Flanked by political and religious leaders and top generals, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced the suspension of the Islamist-tinged constitution and a roadmap for a return to democratic rule under a revised rulebook.”

“The president of the supreme constitutional court will act as interim head of state, assisted by an interim council and a tecnocratic government until new presidential and parliamentary elections are held.

Those in the meeting have agreed on a roadmap for the future that includes initial steps to achieve the building of a strong Egyptian society that is cohesive and does not exclude anyone and ends the state of tension and division, Sisi said in a solemn address broadcast live on state television.”

It was encouraging to see diverse interests standing alongside General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. However, the shutting down of Muslim Brotherhood news stations and arrests / killings of Morsi supporters paints a grim picture for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. What bothers me is what will happen to those not  in the meetings mapping out Egypt’s future–namely the Muslim Brotherhood. Suspensions of freedoms of expression and media independence are also alarming, and make for an unstable basis on which to build a new democracy.

How the new government and the Muslim Brotherhood interacts will determine the ability of Egypt to move forward as a cohesive and peaceful democratic society. If the Brotherhood reacts violently, Egypt may be mired in civil violence for years to come. Only if the Muslim Brotherhood and opposition embrace one-another (admittedly a long shot, at least right away, and one that would require significant political and diplomatic maneuvering) can the new government truly represent all factions of Egyptian society. A modernized Egypt that treats Muslims Brotherhood members as second class citizens can never be a true democracy.

US Support

There is also the question of whether America will continue to back the Egyptian military. If the U.S government finds the Egyptian military indeed seized power via a coup, which lets be honest they did, aid would legally have to be suspended. However, lawyers and politicians will work to keep the long-standing relationship going. Egyptian stability is necessary for Middle-Eastern stability, which is currently in short-supply as is; American leaders will be pragmatic as opposed to idealistic. 

Lots is still up in the air; I will be sure to keep my readers up to date on Egypt’s outlook as more details present themselves.


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Transparency Report: Unrest in Egypt and The Democratic Process

Original article:

“On Friday, Mursi’s Muslim Brotherhood and their allies will gather in Cairo, as will some opposition groups. On Sunday, the opposition hopes millions will heed the call, a year to the day since Mursi became Egypt’s first freely elected leader.

‘I am more determined than ever to go out on June 30 to demand the removal of an absolutely irresponsible president,’ Khaled Dawoud, spokesman for a coalition of liberal parties, said on Thursday after Mursi’s marathon late-night address.

It is hard to gauge how many may turn out but much of the population, even those sympathetic to Islamic ideas, are deeply frustrated by economic slump and many blame the government.”

“Mursi described his opponents as “enemies” and “saboteurs” loyal to the ousted dictator, whose “corruption” had thwarted him and driven the economy into crisis, though he conceded he had made some mistakes and promised reforms.

He also offered talks on “national reconciliation” and changes to a controversial new constitution to end the polarization and paralysis that he said threatened democracy.

Opponents dismissed that as nothing new. Mursi and his allies complain that their opponents, defeated by the highly mobilized Islamist groups in a series of elections last year, are bad losers who have repeatedly snubbed offers to cooperate.”

‘Our demand was early presidential elections and since that was not addressed anywhere in the speech then our response will be on the streets on June 30,’ said Mahmoud Badr, the young journalist behind a petition which has garnered millions of signatures calling on Mursi to quit. ‘I hope he’ll be watching.'”

“Warning ‘violence will only lead to violence’, Mursi urged his opponents to focus on parliamentary elections, which may be held this year, rather than on “undemocratic” demands to overturn his election on the streets: ‘I say to the opposition, the road to change is clear,’ he said. ‘Our hands are extended.'”

I have written many times about the democratic experiment in Egypt here at NN. Egypt is an interesting country, it is the most populous country in the Middle-East, and has a long history of cooperation with Western powers (the U.S. funds the Egyptian military). Egypt’s armed forces will play a crucial role in preventing the Syrian Civil War from turning into a regional conflict (and in maintaining regional security in general). While Turkey is another example of an Islamic state attempting to reconcile democracy and traditional Islamic values, there is something about Egypt’s geographical position that makes it seem like a more robust test of the compatibility of the two ideologies (perhaps Turkey seems European-ized–it is actually seeking EU membership–which may isolate it from more conservative Muslim’s, whereas Egypt is in Africa, which could be more agreeable to those same factions).

For these reasons, alongside the human rights and modernization implications of effective democratic governance, I have been cheering Morsi on in his attempt to bring democracy to Egypt. Sometimes I have been too understanding; Morsi has made mistakes along the way, including targeted violations of the civil rights of his opponents in the name of national security / democracy. President Morsi has owned up to these mistakes, and now seems to have learned what it takes to lead an effective democracy.

Transparency, rule of law, accountability / anti-corruption, personal and societal security, an inclusive and participatory governing process, and the indiscriminate protection of human rights are among the most important aspects of an effective democracy. Morsi has (hopefully) learned that seeking to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime by violating these aspects of democracy, even in the name of national security, is counter-productive. Self-defense is fine, but short of that the opposition must be allowed to assemble. In a religious dictatorship the opposition are terrorists / saboteurs / infidels; in an effective democracy they are simply the opposing political party (again, so long as they use political and not military means to advance their goals). 

So now we have two sides at odds, and in this case I must again take the side of President Morsi, and here is why:

President Morsi has proposed national reconciliation efforts, including making amendments to the constitution (which was open for vote to begin with, the opposition simply refused to participate). He has also proposed the opposition take part in parliamentary elections. Judicial independence has been tricky, as many of the judges in Egypt were assigned under former dictator Hosni Mubarak (packing the courts with his own judges would not ease concerns of a Morsi power-grab either; anyone he appoints, regardless of his background, would be seen by his opponents only as a “Morsi appointee”. Nevertheless, Morsi has offered basically every legitimate democratic avenue available to address the concerns of his opposition.

The opposition, on the other hand, has refused to take part in the democratic process. It will be satisfied with nothing short of Morsi’s removal from office, calling for early presidential elections. Is that any way to establish the credibility of a brand new democratic process, by tossing that process aside instead of trying to work within it? Early elections would undermine the future of democracy in Egypt by setting a bad precedent.

The opposition also continues to emphasize the “15 million signatures it has calling for Morsi’s removal“. Last time I checked, there were 83 million Egyptians, more than half of which are over the legal voting age. Since when has 30-40% of a population been enough to be considered national consensus. If anything the 15 million signature mark–if it is even legitimate–suggests a majority of Egyptians want an end of the political turmoil (with Morsi remaining in power), in order to begin addressing the deteriorating economic and social conditions in Egypt.

So this minority, which refuses to take part in the democratic process, is demanding a step that ultimately undermines the sustainability of democracy in Egypt–thanks but not thanks, I will stick with supporting the imperfect Morsi regime which is at least attempting to make democracy work.

This is not to say that Morsi cannot do things better to ease peoples fears, but the opposition must be willing to come to the table and compromise through democratic channels. One such channel is the National Council For Human Rights in Egypt. Being an “A” rated NHRI (national human rights institution) according to the UN International Coordinating Committee (ICC), the Egyptian council should be a trusted institution in holding the Morsi regime accountable for its human rights duties not only to its constituents but to all Egyptians.

The issue is that the Egyptian NCHR was last reviewed in 2010 (before Morsi came to power), and is not scheduled to be reviewed again until late 2014. In other words, the NHRC has not been reviewed since Morsi has come to power.

The only information I was able to find on the role of the Egyptian NCHR during the Morsi regime comes from the UN Sixty-seventh General Assembly Third Committee 37th Meeting (PM) (November 14th 2012):

MONZER FATHI SELIM (Egypt) said the Council played an important role in supporting States in their primary responsibility to protect all human rights, and it should work to ensure the realization of those rights with full respect to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in order to avoid the politicization, selectivity and double standards that affected its predecessor.  The report reaffirmed the Council’s important role in building national capacities, monitoring human rights, protecting the human rights of Palestinians and strengthening efforts to combat racism, among other things.”

So according to the Egyptian NHRC, its ability to monitor human rights issues has not be compromised since Morsi took office. However, one could argue there may be a conflict of interest if a Morsi crony is running the show. Therefore, Morsi should invite Human Rights Watch, The Center for Economic and Social Rights, Transparency International–literally every and any intentional human rights based organization that wishes to come–to verify the ability of the NHRC to fulfill its functions. Morsi should also extend an invitation to the ICC to perform a formal UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the immediate future, instead of waiting almost a year and a half for the scheduled review.

If Morsi takes these steps, it should separate the legitimate opposition from the Mubarak-era vested interests who want Morsi gone for illegitimate reasons. Additionally, the Morsi regime must stop shooting itself in the foot by denying people their human rights, as this feeds into the claims of the opposition and hurts his regimes legitimacy (which it gained by being the first democratically elected regime in modern Egypt).

There are both domestic and international reasons I want democracy to work in Egypt. Have my own desires clouded my judgment? I think I have been pretty even handed in this analysis, but as always I would like the hear what my readers have to think in the comment section!


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Conflict Watch: Egypt’s Impending Humanitarian Crisis

There has been lots of media coverage over the past two years of the civil unrest in Egypt following the ouster of Honsi Mubarak 2 years ago. While political jockeying continues amongst members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mr. Morsi’s Sunni dominated party) and the small Christian / Shi’ite minority who see his rule as a challenge to their vested interests secured through decades of supporting the military dictator Honsi Mubarak, the majority of Egyptians are presumably pleased with the new freedoms that have come with democracy and wish simply for the political coherence needed to move the country forward.

But those who stand to lose their privileged positions will not give up so easily (there is also the argument that Egypt’s new constitution does not protect minority rights, but I believe this is a scare tactic being used against Morsi’s regime). It is essentially a collective action problem, those who stand to lose from Morsi’s rule stand to lose a lot, while those who stand to benefit stand to gain only incremental benefits (at least in the short run). Morsi’s opponents are also bolstered by the idea that if they can simply continue to apply pressure a little longer, they can break Morsi’s hold on power.

And they may be correct. I for one am a fan of Morsi and the democracy experiment in Egypt. But no matter who is right or wrong, or who really wants what is best for the people of Egypt, if the Morsi government is unable to provide essential services to the people, his opponents will leverage this ineffectiveness as a means to incite further political instability in Egypt.

At the source of this potential humanitarian crisis is the shortage of food and fuel. It also ties into my post yesterday about international finance and energy subsidies:

“The root of the crisis, economists say, is that Egypt is running out of the hard currency it needs for fuel imports. The shortage is raising questions about Egypt’s ability to keep importing wheat that is essential to subsidized bread supplies, stirring fears of an economic catastrophe at a time when the government is already struggling to quell violent protests by its political rivals. “

“United States officials warn of disaster unless Egypt soon carries out a package of tax increases and subsidy cuts tied to a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. That would persuade other lenders that Egypt was creditworthy enough to obtain billions more in additional loans needed to meet its yawning deficit. “

“Egypt has held two years of unsuccessful talks with the I.M.F., and the current government is still balking at the politically painful package of overhauls — even as rising prices and unemployment make those measures more difficult with each passing day.

‘They are operating on the notion that Egypt is too big to be allowed to fail, that the U.S. and the West will step in,’ Mr. Shimy said. ‘They think Egypt has a right to get the loan, and I think they will probably keep pushing all the way.’”

“Energy subsidies make up as much as 30 percent of Egypt’s government spending, said Ragui Assaad, of the Economic Research Forum here. The country imports much of its fuel, and for the first time last year it was forced to import some of the natural gas used to generate electricity — the reason for the recent blackouts. Egypt also imports about 75 percent of its wheat, mixing the superior foreign wheat with lower-quality domestic supplies to improve its subsidized bread. “

“But the two years of mayhem in the streets since the ouster of Mr. Mubarak have decimated tourism and foreign investment, crippling the economy. The government’s reserve of hard currency has fallen to about $13 billion from $36 billion two years ago.”

Part of the problem appears to be people’s expectations. According to Mr. Farash of the Supply Ministry, people are hoarding goods and gaming the system because they fear future uncertainty. Fuel truck drivers are diverting fuel to black markets, and bakeries are reselling their subsidized wheat at higher prices to people who fear future shortages. The thinking being, once shortages do hit, those who have supplies horded will have the goods they need to survive and will be able to sell their excess at a steep profit.

Morsi’s government is planning on installing “smart cards” to increase accountability of fuel truck drivers and bakers, which should make gaming the system more difficult. But people will still find ways to take advantage if they believe it is essential for their future well being. In order to change people’s expectations and their actions, the Morsi government will need to secure international financing to allow the Egyptian economy to run as usual.

This is where the story ties into yesterdays Normative Narratives post. One section of yesterdays post highlighted a recent IMF report stating that countries should stop fuel subsidies as a means of injecting money into the economy. With 30% of Egyptian spending tied up in fuel subsidies, clearly the IMF will not extend financing until Egypt does something to temper its unsustainable fuel subsidies.

But these subsidies are popular amongst the people, something Morsi understandably does not want to undermine early into Egypt’s first attempt at democracy in decades. There are especially important now as the value of the Egyptian pound has plummeted in conjunction with the instability caused by removing Mubarak from power and unemployment remains high. Reducing fuel subsidies will be important for Egypt’s long term fiscal stability, but doing so prematurely—as the IMF is insisting on—would undermine the popular support needed for a democratic regime to govern.

Which brings us to the second point of yesterdays post; the BRICS proposed development bank. The Bank’s purpose is to provide an alternative to IMF and WB financing, and is specifically focused on energy and infrastructure projects. This Bank could be essential to providing the financing that the IMF is currently unwilling to lend without imposing the politically impossible conditions the IMF is insisting on. But this bank was just proposed, is it really possible for it to provide funding that is needed more or less immediately?

Up till this point, unrest in Egypt has been mostly politically motivated. But if a food and fuel shortage based humanitarian crisis unfolds, the Morsi regime will be under real threat of a full blown revolution. It is essential for Egypt’s attempt at democracy to succeed, as it is a natural experiment whose results will dictate whether future attempts at democracy are attempted in the region. In order for Morsi to remain in power, international financing has to come from somewhere. Will the IMF budge on it’s conditionality? Will the BRICS development bank be running soon enough to help stabilize the Egyptian economy? Will Morsi ultimately have to cave in to IMF demands in order to receive emergency financing? Or will the democracy project in Egypt fail? None of the answers to these important questions are yet written in stone—we will have to keep a close eye on the situation as it continues to unfold.

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