However, with China’s more recent rise, what has emerged instead is the so-called “China model” featuring authoritarian capitalism. China is actively promoting this new model of China’s political and economic development in Africa through political party training programs, which constitute a key component of Chinese foreign policy toward Africa.
China has seen remarkable economic growth in the past few decades. About 3/4 of the global reduction in extreme poverty since the end of the Cold War can be attributed to China. But as impressive as its experience has been, China’s growth model cannot be exported to Africa.
Why not? China has a strong, stable central government and a huge population. Despite the inevitable levels of corruption resulting from an economy dominated by government investment and a civil society which is subservient to the government (lack of transparency, accountability / judicial independence / checks-and-balances, no freedom of press/assembly), the Communist Party is somewhat uniquely dedicated to investing in the human capital of its people and providing some semblance of a welfare system.
These positive features that have fueled China’s growth are generally missing in African countries. African economies tend to be natural resource-based, which do not require investment in people for growth but rather patronage politics to keep ruling regimes in power. As a result, the African continent is dominated by poor governance, corruption, poverty and conflict.
China also happens to be reaching the limits of its government-investment and export fueled economic growth model. Because of the Communist Party’s unwillingness to expand civil liberties, China’s greatest avenue for sustainable growth –it’s people’s innovative potential (really the only avenue for long-term sustainable growth for any country, but especially China due to it’s huge population)–remains underutilized. In short, while China’s model can (in the best case scenario) bring a country from low to middle income, it cannot bridge the gap between middle and high income (and as previously stated, the conditions needed for the Chinese model to bring Africa into middle income-dom simply do not exist).
The Communist Party is facing resistance at home, due to the twin forces of increasing demands for political rights (an inevitable result of advances in communication technologies and globalization) and slowing economic growth. Instead of loosening its grip at home to promote economic growth, the Chinese government is tightening its grip abroad. It is effectively trying to buy more time at the expense of regular African people–this is neo-colonialism.
But isn’t this the same as America’s goal of promoting democracy abroad? Perhaps ostensibly, but not functionally. Democracy is based on the concept of self-determination–of people determining their own future and having a government that carries out that vision. Decades of failures and hard-learned lessons in development reinforce the idea that effective democratic governance is the path to peace, stability, and sustainable growth. This is why the United Nation’s new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are based on accountable, inclusive governance and the protection of human rights–i.e. effective democratic governance.
The Chinese model of political economy, on the other hand, places little to no emphasis on the African people. It will enrich Africa’s autocratic leaders and Chinese businessmen in the short-run, leaving the host countries with rising inequality, continued extreme poverty, human rights violations, and conflict.
The only thing the Chinese and American visions for governance and development have in common, aside from being based on capitalism, are that they are visions being offered by outside powers. Other than this, they could not be more different.
China states that the training programs are strictly exchanges of opinions rather than an imposition of the China model on African countries. In other words, China invites African political party cadres to China to study the Chinese way of governance on issues they are interested in, but whether they eventually adopt the Chinese way is purely at their own discretion.
The original article suggests that perhaps China is just offering best practices, take ’em or leave ’em, but other recent actions compound the idea this is part of a larger play. Considering increased military assertiveness by China (South China Sea) and Russia (Crimea, Syria), combined with the economic backing of new Sino-Russo-centric development institutions (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Development Bank (NDB)), and China’s sharing of “best practices” (best for China, anyhow) look like the “soft power” component of a larger “hard power” play to actively and aggressively promote its interests.
Contrast this with likely European (Brexit and other internal EU concerns) and potential American retrenchment (who knows what a Trump presidency could mean for our foreign policy), and an even more concerning picture emerges.
Western backed international organizations, though still the dominant players for now, will face increased competition from organizations (AIIB, NDB) that have lower standards for governance and human rights, potentially compromising what is already a lukewarm embrace of the human rights based approach to development (the IMF, still trying to shake the legacy of failed “Washington Consensus” policies, has embraced more pro-poor, context-sensitive, flexible, ex-ante conditionality; the World Bank, on the other hand, is dragging its feet on mainstreaming human rights into its operations).
Global democratization–which has the benefit of near universal popularity among the civil societies of nations–is facing authoritarian headwinds. Overcoming these authoritarian forces requires strong, principled, long-sighted leadership. Lets hope said leadership is somewhere on the horizon.