Euro | Normative Narratives

September 23, 2017
by bzupnick Leave a comment

Macron Impossible: French Labor Reform and the EU Budget

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Emmanuel Macron won an important election in May, when the young Frenchman defeated right wing populist Marine Le Pen to win the Presidency. In June, Macron’s new En Marche! party claimed another major victory, taking firm control of the French parliament.

In the ensuing months, Macron’s popularity has dipped a bit. This is a non-issue, the regular ebbs and flows of politics; coming in riding so high, he was bound to come back down to earth. To his credit, Macron has not tried to restore his popularity with cheap or symbolic victories. Instead, he is going right for big ticket reforms–the French Labor Code (Code Du Travail) and instituting an EU budget. Should he succeed in these herculean tasks we can forget about his approval ratings, as he would cement himself as one of the great French politicians in modern history.

The French Labor Code, the Code Du Travail, is a 3,324 page document whose origins are over one hundred years old. While I am certainly no expert on this subject specifically, it is essentially the same economic argument often heard in different contexts–worker protections vs. flexibility and growth. (Note: Just because I am advocating for looser worker protections in this case does NOT mean this is the answer in all cases. Economics is always context-sensitive.)

Ultimately this is about risk and faith–the risk of the unknown and faith that private sector growth can unlock more employment and offer a better standard of living than the current system. People are inherently risk averse, and France has a history–even a national identity–tied to championing the proletariat, which is why the Labor code currently looks the way it does:

“That hyper-regulation of much of French life, including labor, was formed in the early 19th century as part of the country’s escape from the chaos of the French Revolution.

“The emerging law,” a prominent Socialist wrote triumphantly in 1903, seven years before the birth of the labor code, “is a Socialist law.”

Indeed, at the heart of the code’s language is the notion that the worker is inevitably an exploitable object needing blanket protection from rapacious capitalist predators.”

Clearly, reform will be an uphill battle. But where there’s a will, and a need, there may be a way. The political will clearly exists, in the form of a President with a parliamentary majority who is willing to take on powerful unions and other dissenters. There is certainly a need to reform; French unemployment is too high at 9.6%, and youth unemployment is significantly higher at a whopping 23.4%. This is France we are talking about here, one of the world’s most developed countries and a pillar of the EU. Such high levels of youth unemployment risk both France and the EU’s future if left unaddressed.

The make reform more palatable, Macron will rely heavily on the idea that market forces can improve people’s lives. Greater demand for French exports would help bolster this argument, which is where his championing of an EU Budget comes into play (at least partially, it is a good idea on its own merits as well).

An EU budget would help the block’s economic performance. Look at the U.S.; in an economic downturn, the Federal government transfers tax revenue from better performing areas to struggling areas via stimulus spending, helping to speed up recovery. The EU needs something analogous if it wants to gain parity with the U.S. in terms of economic clout:

“Elected in May, the French leader is trying to reshape and strengthen the euro currency bloc by creating a euro zone finance minister and parliament, as well as a stand-alone budget to cushion against economic shocks and head off future crises.

But he is running into German resistance despite conciliatory public signals from Chancellor Angela Merkel. Her finance minister has proposed transforming the euro zone’s rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), into a fully fledged EMF with more powers to support weaker members.

“We should head towards a European Monetary Fund but this should in no way be mixed up with a (euro zone) budget,” Macron told Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos.”

Make no mistake, an EU Monetary Fund is certainly a good idea as well. But a budget and a Monetary Fund would be complementary institutions–there is no reason the Euro Zone could not implement both.

On the surface Germany remains opposed to fiscally supporting poorer European countries with direct transfers (this has been its position for some time). However, Germany does seem to be on board with an EU budget in the context of an expanded Euro Zone:

“[German Finance Minister] Schaeuble said that Juncker had discussed with Chancellor Angela Merkel his annual State of the EU speech in which he spoke of a vision of a post-2019 EU where some 30 countries would be using the euro.

The plan also includes appointing an EU finance minister running key budgets to help states in trouble.

“It is good that he is putting pressure (to expand the euro zone) but the preconditions (for joining the euro zone) must be fulfilled,” Schaeuble told the ARD broadcaster in an interview.

“It is in fact so that EU countries who fulfill the preconditions become members of the euro under the Lisbon Treaty”.

He added that EU countries wishing to adopt the single currency should not do so before their public finances and economies are sound enough as they could face the fate of Greece, which had to be bailed out by the EU and IMF in 2010.”

Rigorous “ex-ante” preconditions are absolutely warranted in this situation. Failure to have such conditions for joining a currency union, and relying too much on wishful thinking, can have disastrous results (just ask the Greeks…).

It seems, however, that in the wake of Brexit and seeing what failures of economic governance can mean, that at last the EU’s power players share the same long term vision–now comes the hard work of how to get there. To me, Macron’s plan seems more logical than Juckner and Schaeuble’s for both political and economic reasons.

Politically, by establish a Euro Zone budget and Monetary Fund for the current group, the Euro Zone will be stronger economically, making membership more appealing to outside countries. This would give ammo to political leaders who may have to sell certain unpopular reforms to their citizenries in order to qualify. Economically, a stronger Euro Zone would result in stronger trading partners for non-Euro Zone countries, helping them reach the aforementioned preconditions needed to join.

Maybe I am being overly optimistic, but perhaps neither of these “impossible” but very important reforms Macron is pursuing–to France’s Labor code and the EU’s economic institutions–are as impossible as they once seemed.

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Update: The results of the German election are in. With the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and anti-EU leftist Free Democrats (FDP) performing better than expected, the prospects of closer EU economic integration certainly took a hit (although, in a bit of positive news, the FDP has seemingly softened its anti-EU stance since the election).

It will take true leadership from German Chancellor Angela Merkel to sell these necessary reforms to her coalition members. She will have to become an unabashed champion of these ideas, positioning them as the only means to promote long term economic growth for both Germany and the EU as a whole. It is unclear whether she is willing to take this position, but perhaps in her now fourth term, she is willing to sacrifice her political future to help move Germany and the EU towards the future they need.

Macron’s, for his part, is continuing to drive his vision. One avenue he will propose is greater democratization of EU institutions, as a means to popularize his vision among voters who believe the EU is unaccountable to it’s people.

This uphill battle just got a whole lot steeper…

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Update #2 (2/7/18):

Well, I guess it is always darkest before dawn! It seems that after four months, Germany has a working government coalition. This power sharing agreement between Merkel’s CDU and the more liberal SPD included major concessions to the SPD. One of the main concessions was over the finance ministry position and German support for an EU Budget!:

“In a move likely to herald a shift in Germany’s euro zone policy, a source involved in the negotiations said the SPD would take the finance ministry, a post held until recently by conservative Wolfgang Schaeuble, widely despised in struggling euro zone states during his eight-year tenure for his rigid focus on fiscal discipline.

SPD leader Martin Schulz said earlier this week that his party had ensured an agreement with the conservatives would put an end to “forced austerity” and set up an investment budget for the euro zone.

In a 177-page coalition document, the parties laid out plans to develop the euro zone’s bailout fund into a full-blown European Monetary Fund and support budgetary means to shield the euro zone from crises.

“We want a (European Union) budget for future spending geared toward bringing more benefits for Europe,” they wrote, adding that they backed structural reforms championed by French President Emmanuel Macron.

July 21, 2015
by bzupnick Leave a comment

The Greek Bailout Deal Is A Failure of Leadership in Both Greece and Germany

The terms of the 3rd bailout deal between Greece and its creditors brought a lot of issues to the forefront.

Silly me for thinking negotiations had to with economics–modernizing the Greek economy by enacting needed structural reforms, while providing the Greek government with the fiscal space needed to promote growth and address it’s pressing humanitarian crisis (which said structural reforms would only exacerbate in the short run). Instead, the defining elements of the deal were related to personality and politics.

The Germans were mad at the Greeks, so much so that German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble said perhaps Greece might be better off leaving the Euro–this short-sighted self interest is not suitable behavior for Europe’s de facto leader. Tsipras’s government, for it’s part, apparently did not have a backup plan in case it’s creditors failed to offer a reasonable deal. I know Syriza is new to politics, but you don’t have to be a master negotiator to know that going into negotiations without a backup plan is a flawed strategy.

I was a fan of Tsipras’s government because of the interim agreement it secured in February–the potential for trading structural reforms for fiscal space. But since that point it terribly misplayed its hand. It went into negotiations without a backup plan. It held a referendum at least a month too late–the overwhelming “no” vote would have been a strong bargaining chip had Greece been able to take it back to the negotiating table while still covered under the terms of its prior bailout.

But once those terms expired, and Greek banks closed, the only choices for Greece were Grexit or capitulation. Since there was no plan in place for a Grexit, Greece ended up with the terrible deal it got. That deal–as it currently stands–fails in all regards: financial sustainability, growth prospects, and short term humanitarian concerns.

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Not Financially Viable:

The International Monetary Fund threatened to withdraw support for Greece’s bailout on Tuesday unless European leaders agree to substantial debt relief, an immediate challenge to the region’s plan to rescue the country.

A new rescue program for Greece “would have to meet our criteria,” a senior I.M.F. official told reporters on Tuesday, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “One of those criteria is debt sustainability.”

The I.M.F. is now firmly siding with Greece on the issue. In a reportreleased publicly on Tuesday, the fund proposed that creditors let Athens write off part of its huge eurozone debt or at least make no payments for 30 years.

The I.M.F. said in its report that a write-down could be avoided, but only if creditors extended the schedule for Greece to repay its debt. The only other alternative to a haircut would be for the eurozone countries to give Greece the money it needs to repay them.

“The choice between the various options is for Greece and its European partners to decide,” the I.M.F. report said.

Greece would need to spend a sum equal to more than 15 percent of G.D.P. annually to pay interest and principal on its debt, according to the latest I.M.F. report.

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Does Not Fulfill Greek’s Human Rights:

The implementation of new austerity measures in Greece amid the country’s deteriorating economic crisis must not come at a cost to human rights, a United Nations expert warned today as he urged international institutions and the Greek Government to make “fully informed decisions” before adopting additional reforms.

“I am seriously concerned about voices saying that Greece is in a humanitarian crisis with shortages in medicines and food,” Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, the UN Independent Expert on foreign debt and human rights, stressed in a press statement today. “Priority should be to ensure that everybody in Greece has access to core minimum levels of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health care, food and social security.”

“A debt service burden that may be sustainable from a narrow financial perspective may not be viable at all if one considers the comprehensive concept of sustainable development, which includes the protection of the environment, human rights and social development,” he added.

And of course, as the IMF report highlights, the deal is not even “sustainable from a narrow financial perspective”.

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Kicking the Can or Letting Heads Cool?

If Greece’s creditors, led by Germany, ultimately want to see Greece stay in the Eurozone (for the long run), a friendlier deal is needed. If a “Grexit”, with its short term pain but long term possibilities to return Greece to economic health, is indeed in Greece’s best option given what it’s creditors are willing to offer, why not take that tough medicine and let the healing start? The current deal represents the worst of both worlds–economic pain now and a likely Grexit in the future.

The one positive of this deal is that it did buy time, which should not be undervalued as “Grexit” would be permanent and have terrible geopolitical consequences. But without stimulus (there are talks of a 35 billion euro stimulus fund by 2020 if reforms are fully implemented, but this may be too little too late) and debt restructuring (which cannot be ruled out, but also cannot be counted on), the deal is little more than kicking the can down the road–all while the Greek people continue to suffer.

Greece’s creditors cannot keep dangling future carrots while imposing fiscal restraints which hurt Greece’s already beleaguered citizenry in the here and now. Aid must be synced with structural reforms, or else the Greeks will see their situation go from terrible to worse and reject the terms of this 3rd bailout.

Doing the same thing and expecting different results is the definition of insanity. Greece has tried to implement reforms in order to unlock future aid before, and we see where that got it--a severely contracted economy, depression level unemployment rates, and costly political instability.

This is not the time for more business as usual; this is the time for bold action and trust between Greece and it’s creditors. Unfortunately nothing about the past few months of negotiations suggest this is outcome will be realized.

May 17, 2013
by bzupnick Leave a comment

Economic Outlook: The United States of Europe?

The title of this post is a bit of a joke, even in the unlikely scenario that such a federation is established, I’m sure they would make it a point to make a name less similar to that of the USA. What is not a joke is the state of the European economy, whose unemployment rate and output gap makes America seem like the a model of economic efficiency. (It is impossible to find a single EU or Euro Zone output gap figure, but one can safely assume based on unemployment levels that it is significantly large).

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French President Francois Hollande made strong, if not novel, points.

“The French proposal, which Hollande said he would submit to his eurozone partners, also calls for much deeper fiscal integration between the eurozone nations, with a common budget and the authority to issue debt. The government would also debate the main political and economic decisions to be taken by member states and launch a battle against tax fraud.”

“He acknowledged he could face resistance from Germany, Europe’s dominant power, which opposes mutualising debt among member states. Berlin is also reluctant to give the euro zone its own secretariat for fear of deepening division in the EU, between the 17 members of the single currency and the 10 others.

Non-euro Britain’s government already faces growing domestic pressure to hold a referendum on leaving the bloc.

Hollande said he wanted Britain to stay in the EU but added: “I can understand that others don’t want to join (the single currency). But they cannot stop the euro zone from advancing.”

Hollande said a future euro zone economic government would debate the main political and economic decisions to be taken by member states, harmonize national fiscal and welfare policies, and launch a battle against tax fraud.

He proposed bringing forward planned EU spending to combat record youth unemployment, pushing for an EU-wide transition to renewable energy sources, and envisaged “a budget capacity that would be granted to the euro zone along with the gradual possibility of raising debt”.

He also called for a 10-year public investment plan in the digital sector, the promised energy transition, public health and in big transport infrastructure projects.”

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Indeed, these concepts are not new. There has always been doubt as to whether the Europe had the necessary preconditions for a strong currency union (based on the theory of optimal currency area). There is considerable economic interdependence, but differences in language and culture make labor less mobile (which is why some countries in the EU have unemployment rates above 25%, while others are high but more manageable).

The head of the Economics department at Fordham, Dominick Salvatore, (a man whom I greatly admire) wrote about the issue of having a currency union without fiscal coordination in the early 1990s. He was probably not the only one to identify this obvious flaw. European leaders thought that by creating the EU and Euro zone, that greater coordination would naturally occur, however this has largely not taken place (at least with respect to fiscal coordination).

The E.U. is at a cross-roads (it has been at it for some time). Britain will eventually have a referendum on whether or not to stay in the EU (a few high level officials have recently signaled they would vote to leave). The economic recovery in Europe has been non-existent. If a stronger European economic government make the Euro zone project more sustainable, it would be in the best interest of both the 17 Euro Zone countries and the 10 countries in the E.U. but without the Euro.

I used to be worried about a E.U. breakup, but I do not think such an outcome would be as painful as a Euro zone breakup. The E.U. was recently given the Nobel Prize, a symbolic move emphasizing the importance of the block of countries in promoting democracy and human rights globally. But if the E.U. wished to merely become a FTA or common market, I do not see any of the countries drastically changing their political ideology. All of these countries still have a shared history in which peace and trade led to mutually beneficial outcomes, while war and isolation led to pain and suffering; allowing countries to leave the E.U. to sustain the Euro Zone would not change this. Indeed, I do not believe there is any foreseeable outcome that could change decades of hard learned lessons .

Economic integration would continue to exist between non Euro Zone and Euro Zone countries. The Euro Zone, with a more unified political and economic voice, would undoubtedly be a more meaningful partner with the U.S. in terms of global governance. The Euro Zone would become more effective in global security measures, with a strong unified military–in this sense having the Euro Zone move forward without all of the E.U. would help achieve many of the original goals of the E.U.

There is no question that a monetary union cannot be sustained without fiscal coordination. President Hollande was dead on when he said “I can understand that others don’t want to join (the single currency). But they cannot stop the euro zone from advancing.” Sometimes you have to cut off the limb to save the patient, and it seems like this might be the case with the Euro Zone. E.U countries not in the Euro Zone could wake-up tomorrow, decide to leave, and as long as economic ties remained very little would change. If the Euro Zone fell apart, there would be unprecedented losses as countries scrambled to put the pieces of their monetary policies back together.

If allowing countries to leave the E.U. is what it takes to make the Euro Zone sustainable, then this option has to be explored. When has forcing someone to stay, when popular consensus is to go, ever led to a sustainable union? If countries want to go, they should be allowed to go, so that those who remain can move forward.