A member of Iraqi federal forces holds the Kurdish flag upside down in Kirkuk, Iraq on October 16, 2017.REUTERS/Stringer
Remember when the fate of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad was uncertain, the country mired in a horrific Civil War with no end in sight while the IS was rapidly gaining ground? Remember when Iraqi forces fled IS advances, abandoning Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city? You should remember both, they were only a few years ago…
You should also remember how, in both cases, the Kurds proved themselves to be capable, brave fighters. They were and continue to be a stable faction in a volatile region–native boots on the ground that the U.S. can rely on. But facts on the ground can change quickly, especially when external powers intervene decisively in a conflict.
Seemingly a victory, a referendum for Kurdish independence quickly soured when the Iraqi military retook the Kirkuik oil field (backed by Iranian proxies). Yes, the same Iraqi military that melted away in the face of IS fighters and needed the Kurds to help clean up their mess, turned their guns on the Kurds for exercising self-determination.
In addition to being capable fighters, the Kurds have a penchant for democratic governance and women’s rights. In terms of a Middle Eastern partner, they are a dream match for the U.S.. We always lament the fact that we do have not enough true, democratic allies in the region, but I fear we are now abandoning one because supporting them doesn’t fits into Trump’s “America First” foreign policy.
In Iraq, we stood by as the Iraqi military and Iranian militias ripped away the would-be heart of any future Kurdish state. But the U.S. has invested a ton of resources into maintaining a unified Iraq; while I cannot agree with America’s inaction here, it is somewhat understandable.
What about in Syria, where this is not the case? Here too we are failing to protect our ally. In order to appease Turkish President Erdogan, President Trump has said he will stop arming the Kurds.
This is the problem with Trump’s “America First” foreign policy–it is inherently short-sighted. Is it in America’s short term interests to defend the Kurds now? Probably not–we used em’ and now we could lose em’. Turkey is stronger than the Kurds; it is easier to give in to our more powerful “ally’s” wishes here regardless what is “right”, even as President Erdogan continues to turn Turkey into an authoritarian, non-secular country.
Turkey does have some legitimate concerns about its territorial integrity when it comes to Kurdish statehood. Despite the erosion of Turkish democracy, Turkey is far from a “failed state” (as Iraq was and Syria still is), making the case for appropriating Turkish land for a Kurdish state much weaker. Mechanisms could be set up to protect Turkish sovereignty and borders alongside the introduction of a Kurdish state, which I have outlined in a previous blog post.
More pointedly, if Turkey didn’t want the Kurds to have a much stronger claim to their own state, it should have acted more decisively in the Syrian Civil War and in the fight against the IS. Instead Turkey, like the rest of the global and regional powers, let the Kurds do the heavy lifting. Now, understandably, the Kurds want their just deserts.
Would continuing to decisively back the Kurds upset some powerful players? Yes. What meaningful change does not? What happened to Trump’s supposed bravado? Risk aversion will only reaffirm to the status-quo in the Middle East–picking the least bad autocrats to be our allies, while the region remains mired in conflict and stalled development. Building true democratic allies in the Middle East will not be quick or easy, but it is important work nonetheless.
Now to be fair, in international affairs long-term goals need to be weighed against short-term security concerns, and shortsightedness is not exclusive to the Trump administration. Obama did not do enough to protect a budding democracy in Egypt, and was too risk averse in Syria, allowing Russia to eventually come in and dictate the result of the conflict. There is, however, a sense that the Trump administration will not even really weigh these options when making tough decisions. After all, Trump has shown at best a lukewarm appreciation for democratic institutions at home (attacks on the judiciary and independent media) and has praised authoritarian leaders abroad. It is, therefore, no stretch of the imagination to think that he will, by default, opt for the easy solution without even considering the long-term benefits of promoting democratic governance.
In this case, even considering the potential negatives, abandoning the Kurds would be one of America’s most short-sighted decisions the Middle East since we sleepwalked into the Iraq War in the first place. Based on what we know about Trump and his “America First” foreign policy, it is not likely to be the last short-sighted decision either.
Update (1/27):I knew Trump wouldn’t do the right thing…The U.S. has agreed to stop arming the Syrian Kurds to appease Turkey’s Erdogan. Erdogan, sensing weakness in Trump’s resolve, is trying to further dictate terms to the U.S., demanding we remove all of our troops from Manbij.
It would be incredible to imagine the U.S. allowing another country to dictate where we keep our troops, particularly since Manbij is part of Syria, not Turkey. With that being said, nothing would surprise me anymore; all bets are off with the Trump administration.
Bottom line–Turkey and Erdogan have no right to tell us who we can ally with, and where to position our troops.
“Just as we benefit by combatting inequality within our countries, I believe advanced economies still need to do more to close the gap between rich and poor nations around the globe. This is difficult politically. It’s difficult to spend on foreign assistance. But I do not believe this is charity,” he [Obama] stressed.
“For the small fraction of what we spent at war in Iraq, we could support institutions so that fragile States don’t collapse in the first place; and invest in emerging economies that become markets for our goods. It’s not just the right thing to do – it’s the smart thing to do,” said Mr. Obama.
“We can only realize the promise of this institution’s founding – to replace the ravages of war with cooperation – if powerful nations like my own accept constraints,” Mr. Obama declared “Sometimes I’m criticized in my own country for professing a belief in international norms and multilateral institutions.
“But I am convinced that in the long run, giving up some freedom of action – not giving up our ability to protect ourselves or pursue our core interests, but binding ourselves to international rules over the long term – enhances our security. And I think that’s not just true for us,” he added.
Obama’s final UN General Assembly address included a strong endorsement of preventative peacebuilding. This endorsement is the result of a hard-learned lesson–that investing in conflict prevention is much cheaper than fighting wars and/or paying for humanitarian aid to deal with the spillover of conflicts.
But Obama’s address also included a lukewarm-at-best embrace of UN Security Council reform. America need not worry about “giving up our ability to protect ourselves”–our military supremacy will continue to keep us safe from “traditional threats” (an invasion by an enemy army).
Security Council reform would address the source of the real threats facing America today–failed states and their resulting power vacuums. Failed states allow terrorist groups to take root, and either carry out their own attacks or inspire lone-wolf terrorists remotely.
The current UN Security Council structure shields oppressive dictators from accountability, allowing them to hold onto power as they lose control of their countries. By providing an avenue to override a UN Security council veto, the international community would be much more responsive in addressing failing states. Greater protection of democratic aspirations and human rights, through UN Security Council reform, should be how we “pursue our core interest”–peace and prosperity through economic interdependence.
The Future of American Foreign Policy
If Hilary Clinton is truly the heir apparent to Obama, hopefully she shares his views on preventative peacebuilding. Hillary has taken some flack from the left for being more of a neocon (interventionist) than Obama, but under the right conditions this is actually a good thing. Allow me to explain.
Preventative peacebuilding is a very important element of foreign policy–as previously mentioned it saves on future military and humanitarian spending, not to mention the lives saved and economic damage prevented in the host-countries. However, once a conflict is already underway (prevention is never foolproof), it must be addressed before it become intractable (a la Syria, the issue Obama say’s he has second-guessed the most of any during his presidency and for good reason, because his approach has failed spectacularly).
Trump is right about one (I stress, ONE) thing–our allies need to start paying their share to uphold global security. Furthermore, there must be repercussions for them not doing so, otherwise the status-quo of America footing the bill will persist (Obama’s denunciation of “free-rider” allies is just rhetoric, it won’t accomplish anything).
This last point means that Trump’s plan is not the rebalancing of global defense spending America so sorely needs, but rather a global military build-up. This stance counters the ultimate purpose–American lives and tax dollars saved–of his ONE good idea…
America’s future President should adopt a foreign policy that is a large part Obama (preventative peacebuilding), part Hillary Clinton (willingness to intervene before it is too late), and a little bit Trump (willingness to exert pressure on our allies to pay their fair share for global security). UN Security Council reform would bolster each of these pillars of American foreign policy.
However, with China’s more recent rise, what has emerged instead is the so-called “China model” featuring authoritarian capitalism. China is actively promoting this new model of China’s political and economic development in Africa through political party training programs, which constitute a key component of Chinese foreign policy toward Africa.
China has seen remarkable economic growth in the past few decades. About 3/4 of the global reduction in extreme poverty since the end of the Cold War can be attributed to China. But as impressive as its experience has been, China’s growth model cannot be exported to Africa.
China also happens to be reaching the limits of its government-investment and export fueled economic growth model. Because of the Communist Party’s unwillingness to expand civil liberties, China’s greatest avenue for sustainable growth –it’s people’s innovative potential (really the only avenue for long-term sustainable growth for any country, but especially China due to it’s huge population)–remains underutilized. In short, while China’s model can (in the best case scenario) bring a country from low to middle income, it cannot bridge the gap between middle and high income (and as previously stated, the conditions needed for the Chinese model to bring Africa into middle income-dom simply do not exist).
The Communist Party is facing resistance at home, due to the twin forces of increasing demands for political rights (an inevitable result of advances in communication technologies and globalization) and slowing economic growth. Instead of loosening its grip at home to promote economic growth, the Chinese government is tightening its grip abroad. It is effectively trying to buy more time at the expense of regular African people–this is neo-colonialism.
But isn’t this the same as America’s goal of promoting democracy abroad? Perhaps ostensibly, but not functionally. Democracy is based on the concept of self-determination–of people determining their own future and having a government that carries out that vision. Decades of failures and hard-learned lessons in development reinforce the idea that effective democratic governance is the path to peace, stability, and sustainable growth. This is why the United Nation’s new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are based on accountable, inclusive governance and the protection of human rights–i.e. effective democratic governance.
The Chinese model of political economy, on the other hand, places little to no emphasis on the African people. It will enrich Africa’s autocratic leaders and Chinese businessmen in the short-run, leaving the host countries with rising inequality, continued extreme poverty, human rights violations, and conflict.
The only thing the Chinese and American visions for governance and development have in common, aside from being based on capitalism, are that they are visions being offered by outside powers. Other than this, they could not be more different.
China states that the training programs are strictly exchanges of opinions rather than an imposition of the China model on African countries. In other words, China invites African political party cadres to China to study the Chinese way of governance on issues they are interested in, but whether they eventually adopt the Chinese way is purely at their own discretion.
The original article suggests that perhaps China is just offering best practices, take ’em or leave ’em, but other recent actions compound the idea this is part of a larger play. Considering increased military assertiveness by China (South China Sea) and Russia (Crimea, Syria), combined with the economic backing of new Sino-Russo-centric development institutions (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Development Bank (NDB)), and China’s sharing of “best practices” (best for China, anyhow) look like the “soft power” component of a larger “hard power” play to actively and aggressively promote its interests.
Contrast this with likely European (Brexit and other internal EU concerns) and potential American retrenchment (who knows what a Trump presidency could mean for our foreign policy), and an even more concerning picture emerges.
Global democratization–which has the benefit of near universal popularity among the civil societies of nations–is facing authoritarian headwinds. Overcoming these authoritarian forces requires strong, principled, long-sighted leadership. Lets hope said leadership is somewhere on the horizon.
In terms of British internal affairs, I find it difficult to take a stance on the outcome of the Brexit vote. Britain may be poorer in the short run, but capital and trade will return to normal as markets self-correct, so I do not foresee a prolonged economic slump. I also do not foresee a further unraveling of the E.U., as there are really no other countries like Britain in the E.U. (or more accurately, if other countries do leave, it will be because of structural issues facing the E.U. that predated Brexit). Of course many will disagree, and much more can be said on either of these claims, but I am glossing over them to get to my main point.
There is nothing to be gained by stomping your feet because the referendum’s outcome is not what you may have liked. In fact, in some ways it was refreshing to see a referendum whose outcome was genuinely up-in-the-air. This is how democracy works–if you wish you could impose a result on this referendum, you are missing the point (or maybe I am–counter-point).
Where I believe Brexit can do its worst long-term damage is not to Britain, or the U.K., or even to the E.U. as a whole. Britain and the E.U. at large are modern, democratic, capitalist countries, and as such will prove resilient. It is the world’s developing regions where Brexit will have its greatest impact. These regions need greater contributions in terms of economic aid, democratic capacity building, and conflict prevention / resolution. In terms of conflict prevention / resolution, even before Brexit the E.U. was already punching below its weight, and Britain was one of the few active European armed forces. I cannot see how Brexit will not compromise European contributions on these important fronts:
Britain’s decision to quit the European Union could send damaging shockwaves through the bedrock Anglo-American “special relationship,” raising questions about London’s willingness and ability to back U.S.-led efforts in global crises ranging from the Middle East to Ukraine.
The loss of the strongest pro-U.S. voice within the 28-nation bloc, as a result of the “Brexit” referendum, threatens to weaken Washington’s influence in European policymaking and embolden Russian President Vladimir Putin to further challenge the West, analysts and former diplomats say.
Phil Gordon, a former senior foreign policy adviser to Obama, expressed concern that Europe will become inwardly focused on Britain’s departure and independence movements on the continent, leaving the United States to shoulder more of the international burden.
Cameron has cooperated closely with Obama in the security sphere. Britain has been a major military player in U.S.-led campaigns against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq, an active ally on the ground in Afghanistan and a strong supporter of sanctions against Russia over its role in Ukraine’s separatist conflict.
While “state-building” may be a fools errand, failing to nurture budding democratic movements, particularly in authoritarian countries, risks losing genuine opportunities for development, the slaughter of innocent people, and the setback of these movements for decades.
The global march towards democratization has naturally slowed down post Cold-War as the “low hanging fruit” of democratization realized their democratic aspirations. But with Brexit (coupled with an increasingly assertive Russia and China), the inevitability of eventual global democratization for the first time comes into question.
The U.S. has more than carried its share of the load in promoting a democratic international order as Europe built itself back up from the ashes of WWII and further modernized following the Cold War. Now, when domestic considerations are forcing the U.S. to at very least not increase its role in the world, Brexit has compromised the capacity of the only partner that could realistically pick up some of the slack.
Perhaps a pan-European army was never going to be a reality, but Brexit likely made it harder to coordinate the build-ups of individual European armed forces in a synergistic way.
Britain is a valued member of NATO, but if it is weakened economically by its decision to leave the European Union, its leaders might come under public pressure to pare back military spending — even as the United States is pressuring NATO members to spend more on defense.
The European Union often frustrates American presidents, yet the disintegration of the bloc would be a geopolitical disaster for Washington. Even before Britain’s exit, Germany was Europe’s dominant power, andChancellor Angela Merkel was Europe’s dominant leader.
“Britain leaving the E.U. now poses a challenge for Germany,” said Nicholas Burns, a former top American diplomat who now teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School. “It will need to provide even greater leadership to keep Europe united and moving forward.”
What the Brits decide to do within their own country is their own decision. However, the role Britain plays in international affairs has massive global implications. Hopefully Britain’s new leadership understands this, and acts accordingly.
Warplanes level a hospital in the rebel-held half of Aleppo, Syria, killing one of the city’s last pediatricians. A Saudi-led military coalition bombs a hospital in Yemen. In Afghanistan, American aircraft pummel a hospital mistaken for a Taliban redoubt.
The rules of war, enshrined for decades, require hospitals to be treated as sanctuaries from war — and for health workers to be left alone to do their jobs.
But on today’s battlefields, attacks on hospitals and ambulances, surgeons, nurses and midwives have become common, punctuating what aid workers and United Nations officials describe as a new low in the savagery of war.
On Tuesday [5/3], the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to remind warring parties everywhere of the rules, demanding protection for those who provide health care and accountability for violators. The measure urged member states to conduct independent investigations and prosecute those found responsible for violations “in accordance with domestic and international law.”
But the resolution also raised an awkward question: Can the world’s most powerful countries be expected to enforce the rules when they and their allies are accused of flouting them?
The failure to uphold decades-old international humanitarian law stems from the failure to uphold a more recently established principle–the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)–which states:
Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people.
The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;
The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;
The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
To be fair, the rise of non-state actors (terrorists) in conflict has made it harder to uphold humanitarian law–these parties do not play by the rules. But typically poor governance is a cause of terrorism, not a result of it. Regardless, the R2P is focused on the role of the state; if the R2P should be invoked when a state fails to protect its population from war crimes, how then can it not be invoked when the state is the primary perpetrator of such crimes?
Failure to uphold the R2P has enabled the current hurting stalemate in Syria, so rife with violations of international humanitarian law that we no longer bat an eye when a story comes across our news feed. You may be asking what exactly is International Humanitarian Law? What is human rights law? There is a lot of overlap, so a quick crash course:
It is important to differentiate between international humanitarian law and human rights law. While some of their rules are similar, these two bodies of law have developed separately and are contained in different treaties. In particular, human rights law – unlike international humanitarian law – applies in peacetime, and many of its provisions may be suspended during an armed conflict.
International humanitarian law protects those who do not take part in the fighting, such as civilians and medical and religious military personnel.
Essentially, international humanitarian law exists to protect certain human rights of non-aggressors in conflict zones. Human rights are broader (economic / social, political / civil, cultural), and are also applicable during times of peace. Upholding human rights obligations is the key to preventing conflict (positive peace), upholding humanitarian law is meant to protect people’s rights when prevention fails.
It is not my contention that, absent the R2P, we would not see such blatant violations of international humanitarian law. The R2P was crafted in response to the realities of modern warfare, which is dominated by protracted social conflicts (as opposed to the interstate wars of old). The R2P is a positive, an innovation in international governance, but it has proven itself toothless. When the international community fails to adequately respond to the greatest violations of the R2P (when states themselves are the perpetrators of war crimes and violate international humanitarian law), it enables new conflicts to emerge and existing ones to fester by signaling that at the end of the day, when there are no other options but the use force, state sovereignty still trumps human rights. The R2P was just the naming of the beast–you still have to slay it.
Early detection of human rights violations through the U.N.’s Human Rights Upfront (HRuF) initiative and a greater focus on preventative peacebuiding are important advancements in international governance. But when a ruler is willing to plunge his country into civil war to hang onto his rule, the R2P must be there to counter him. TheR2P should be the mechanism through which we alter the war calculus of such tyrants. Without this deterrent, the effectiveness of HRuF and preventative peacebuilding initiatives are severely curtailed.
The playbook for tyrannical rulers to resist democratic movements has been laid out by Assad–plunge your country into civil war, wait for terrorists to fill the power void of your failed state, and position yourself as the only actor who can fight the terrorists.
Then, when the international community calls for a political transition to end the fighting, the very parties that went to war to resist the will of the people (In this case Russia, Iran, and Assad himself)–parties with zero democratic credentials themselves–have the gall to invoke the idea of self-determination / respecting the will of the people.
This perversion of the concept of self-determination is particularly infuriating, given the incredible damage caused by an initial unwillingness to even engage the peoples democratic aspirations with dialogue instead of violence. Even if such calls did represent a legitimate pivot towards democratic values (which they most certainly do not), of course no meaningful election could ever take place in a war-zone.
Combined with current external realities–budget strained and war weary democracies are (for various reasons) not as committed in the fight for democracy as authoritarian regimes are against it–a tyrant will more often than not be able stay in power, at a huge cost to the people, the country, and the region.
This message–that the purported global champions of democracy and human rights cannot be counted on to support you (while the governments you oppose, which have the military advantage to begin with, will get significant external help)–is the only thing that can stem the tide of global democratization. This cannot be the message (that through our actions) the U.S and E.U. sends to people with democratic aspirations. Democratization is the only path towards modernization and sustainable development–it is truly “the worst form of government, except for all the others” as Winston Churchill famously stated.
Which is why I call for more military spending by wealthier democracies (and more evenly distributed, America should cut back) and U.N.Security Council reform. Acting preventatively is always the best option, when it is still an option.But when prevention fails, we cannot simply throw our hands up an say “oh well, prevention is not an option, guess there is nothing we can do.” In the face of slaughter, words ring hollow and inaction carries a cost as well.
UPDATE: With U.S. backed coallitons making advances in Mosul (Iraq) and Raqqa (Syria), and Sirte (Libya), with little news of IS expansion elsewhere, it seems like I may have been wrong on the need for a significant force of Western troops to defeat the IS on the battlefield.
I will leave this post up because it still contains important points about the multifaceted approach needed to defeat the IS ideology. But I believe it is important to admit when you are wrong, and in this case I was.
It is commonly accepted that the fight against the Islamic State (IS) is not solely a military fight. When the U.S. led coalition outlined its plan for combating the group, three main fronts emerged:
Let’s examine how we are doing on each of these fronts, before considering the larger goal of defeating the IS:
It is notoriously difficult to police social media sites. Creating an account is free and monitoring content costs money. When an account is shut down, another one pops-up.
The IS has proven itself adept at using social media as both a recruitment tool and as a platform to amplify its message of terror. Good production quality has had the effect of making the group seem more permanent.
Social media sites, understanding the importance of countering the IS message, are stepping up to the plate (perhaps due to the fact that their own infrastructure is being exploited by these groups). One weak spot until recently was Twitter, but a new report shows the company has started to make a stronger effort:
The Islamic State’s English-language reach on Twitter has stalled in recent months amid a stepped-up crackdown against the extremist group’s army of digital proselytizers, who have long relied on the site to recruit and radicalize new adherents, according to a study being released on Thursday.
Twitter Inc (TWTR.N) has long been criticized by government officials for its relatively lax approach to policing content, even as other Silicon Valley companies like Facebook Inc (FB.O) began to more actively police their platforms.
Under intensified pressure from the White House, presidential candidates and some civil society groups, Twitter announced earlier this month it had shut down more than 125,000 terrorism-related accounts since the middle of 2015, most of them linked to the Islamic State group.
In a blog post, the company said that while it only takes down accounts reported by other users it had increased the size of teams monitoring and responding to reports and has decreased its response time “significantly.”
It does not appear social media will become less popular anytime soon. As long as it is a platform that billions of people use, extremist groups will try to use it to further their causes (especially given the success the IS has had).
Therefore, it is the responsibility of social media companies to do everything they can to fight this misuse–it should be a liability issue, a cost of doing business for a very profitable industry.
Fighting a war and running a “state” are not cheap–the IS has to at least appear to offer some social services and run certain institutions if it wants to claim it is a “state”.
The IS primary revenue streams are selling oil, taxing the people in areas it subjugates, seizing money from banks in those areas, and (to a lesser extent) other illicit activities (selling stolen antiques, ransoming hostages, drug trade, etc).
Air strikes have reduced Islamic State’s ability to extract, refine and transport oil, a major source of revenue that is already suffering from the fall in world prices. Since October the coalition says it has destroyed at least 10 “cash collection points” estimated to contain hundreds of millions of dollars.
U.S. military officials say reports of Islamic State cutting fighters’ wages by up to half are proof that the coalition is putting pressure on the group.
In January, the coalition said air strikes against Islamic State oil facilities had cut the group’s oil revenues by about 30 percent since October, when U.S. defense officials estimate the group was earning about $47 million per month.
[U.S. Army Colonel Steve] Warren said air strikes against Islamic State’s financial infrastructure were “body blows like a shot to the gut”.
“(It) may not knock you out today but over time begins to weaken your knees and cause you to not be able to function the way you’d like to,” he told reporters last week.
It is true there is a limit to what airstrikes can accomplish against the IS without more soldiers on the ground. But airstrikes can be very effective in disrupting oil production and blowing up known cash storage sites. This is an area where the U.S. could expand its efforts more or less unilaterally.
One way to do this could be reconsidering what an acceptable target is. The U.S. led coalition has made an effort to avoid striking areas with expensive infrastructure, in hopes it can be used if wrestled back from the IS. But, as Ramadi has proven, the IS will rig any areas it loses with explosives before it leaves, so perhaps we should rethink trying to spare infrastructure if it means we can make a more significant dent in the IS finances.
What we cannot do is disregard civilian casualties–“carpet bombing” IS held areas is not a viable option. Not only would such a strategy be morally reprehensible, but it would be counter-productive, reinforcing the IS anti-Western message.
In recent months, the IS has lost significant territory in Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately, the groups practice of rigging areas it loses with explosives makes it very difficult to turn liberated areas back to “normal” (safe for displaced people to return and lead productive lives).
Furthermore,these gains have not always been made in “sustainable” ways. In Syria, the Assad regime has gained much of the territory the IS has lost (although the Kurds, natural allies to the West, have also gained territory). In Iraq, a Shiite dominated government has made advances with the aid of Iranian fighters, risking further alienating Iraq’s Sunni population (which paved the way for the rise of the IS in the first place).
In Libya’s incredibly important neighbor Tunisia, the freedoms associated the country’s successful democratic transition have created more space for the IS to operate. Ultimately effective pluralistic democratic governance, which respects the human rights of all people, is the only way to defeat the IS. We must provide Tunisia with all the support it needs, to ensure that democratization does not become a tool the IS uses to its advantage in the short-run.
Degrading AND Defeating the Islamic State
The good news is we have made progress on each of the three main fronts in the fight against IS (Social Media, Financial, Traditional Warfare). The bad news is that while we are able to degrade the IS, we have done so in a way that ignores the underlying factors that led to the groups rise in the first place.
Let’s not downplay the very real benefits of degrading the IS. It limits the groups ability to spread misery and death. It compromises the groups ability to carry out attacks abroad, and reduces the likelihood it will inspire lone-wolf attackers.
But the fight against the IS is expensive, and the longer the group is allowed to operate, the more it’s assertion that it is a “caliphate” becomes the fact on the ground. Moreover, time gives the IS (which has proven itself quite tactical and resilient) room to metastasize and evolve. Imagine if the group connected its Middle Eastern territory with large swaths of Northern Africa, transforming its ideological link to Boko Haram into an actual military alliance? This may seem like an unlikely scenario, but everything the IS has done up until this point has defied the odds against it.
To avoid perpetual war we must degrade the IS in a way that also attacks the groups underlying message–that there is no viable alternative for Muslims. On this front, much work remains. Governments in Islamic countries should put aside sectarian divides and treat the fight against the IS as the fight for the soul of Islam that it is. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest this will happen anytime soon, a point recently made by political comedian Bill Maher:
“Why don’t they fight their own battles? Why are Muslim armies so useless against ISIS? ISIS isn’t 10 feet tall. There are 20,000 or 30,000 of them. The countries surrounding ISIS have armies totaling 5 million people. So why do we have to be the ones leading the fight? Or be in the fight at all?”
If you consider the countries bordering Iraq and Syria — Iran (with 563,000 armed forces personnel), Jordan (115,500), Kuwait (22,600), Lebanon (80,000), Saudi Arabia (251,500) and Turkey (612,800) — you get a total of 1.6 million.
Add in Iraq (177,600) and Syria (178,000) themselves and that brings the total to 2 million. That’s less than half of Maher’s figure.
When we heard back from Maher’s spokesman, he said the comedian was also including the armies of Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
If they (reservists) are included as part of a country’s army, the total for those 13 countries Maher wants to include rises to 4.95 million, as Maher said.
If you don’t include the reservists, the number of troops in the countries cited by the comedian only rises to 3.6 million.
Looking at the largest Muslim players, there is little hope in sight. Turkey is more interested in fighting the Kurds–one of the strongest forces against the IS–than the IS itself. Saudi Arabia and Iran are wrapped up in proxy wars in Syria and Yemen, and are ideologically opposed to pluralism, democracy, and one another. Egypt under Sisi has become increasingly authoritarian, and as a result finds itself consumed by its own terrorist insurgency. Iraq, as mentioned earlier, is relying too heavily on Iranian forces. In Syria, Assad is hoping that with Russian and Iranian support he can knock out all opposition except the IS, completing his “fighting terrorism” narrative and cementing himself in power as he kills indiscriminately. Jordan seems like a true ally in this fight, but it itself is a monarchy that will not fight for democratic values, and even if it would it cannot be expected to take on this fight alone.
It often seems that the IS is everyone’s second biggest concern. The inability to rally a meaningful Pan-Arabic counter-insurgency against the IS is not ideal (and is actually quite sad), but it is a reality we must acknowledge if we are to put together a coalition that CAN end the group’s reign of terror.
To this end, we need more support from those who do share our values. America cannot be the World’s Police, but the world does need a “police force”. Every country that believes in and has benefited from democratic governance and human rights has a role to play. A global coalition (including ground troops) must include all these parties, and be proportionately funded and manned (meaning the U.S. will still have to play a major leadership role).
To some, such a coalition may seem even less likely than a meaningful Pan-Arabic counter-insurgency. But in my mind, corralling support from interdependent allies that share common values and coordinating financing to fairly and sustainably spreads the cost is more achievable than completely changing the behavior of historically adversarial actors.
He [Current General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft] also touched on the issue of Security Council reform, saying the subject was “of central importance to a large majority of the Membership” of the UN, and that the General Assembly had decided to immediately continue the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in its 70th session.
Mr. Jürgenson [Vice President of ECOSOC] said that the relationship between the Charter bodies of the UN should be revitalized.
“The changing nature of conflict, from inter-State wars to complex civil conflicts that are intractable and reoccurring, highlights the fundamental link between sustainable development and lasting peace,” he said.
ECOSOC and the Security Council, he said, can interact on a regular basis on issues of concern to them both, from the promotion of institution building and improved governance to the consequences of economic and financial crises on global stability and the impact of environmental degradation on weakened societies.
“On each dimension of sustainable development, economic, social or environmental and on their contribution to the overall objective of peace, the UN development system, under the oversight of ECOSOC, has a lot to contribute,” he said. “The Economic and Social Council can be the counterpart of the Security Council to embrace a truly holistic approach to peace and security, an approach that world leaders have recognized as the only one which can lead to sustainable results.”
Human rights theory recognizes the broad array of human rights (economic, social, cultural, political and civil) are mutually dependent. Furthermore, certain rights, such as civil and political rights, create the enabling environment needed for people to claim other rights / hold violators accountable.
Any society that prioritizes the human rights of all its citizens will, in time, experience a virtuous cycle of sustainable human development and “positive peace“. In contrast, a society that “tolerates” certain human rights abuses in the name of security / stability greatly risks further restrictions of other rights; one rights violation invites others, and the vicious cycle of repression, poverty, and conflict emerges.
The human rights based approach to development therefore recognizes the interdependence of ostensibly separate U.N. operations. Specifically, preventative action–natural disaster preparedness and conflict prevention–feature prominently in development efforts.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UNs primary development policy body, uses the slogan “Empowered Lives, Resilient Nations”. “Empowered lives” refers to upholding human rights obligations and consultative policy-making–enabling people in the developing world to be active participants in their country’s modernization. “Resilient nations” refers to conflict prevention and natural disaster mitigation, reasonable welfare programs, and the social cohesion and institutions needed to resolve internal grievances peacefully.
Of course, prevention and preparation only work at certain points during disaster response. Conflicts in full swing must be addressed decisively or they will fester and devolve. Countries that do not amply invest in natural disaster preparedness must bare huge rebuilding costs (this is not just a poor country problem, think about the devastation caused in the U.S. by Hurricane Katrina and Super-Storm Sandy).
Addressing issues once they have reached catastrophic levels is much more expensive than investment in prevention / mitigation.The current model–ignoring warning signs followed by a too-little-too-late response–strains humanitarian aid budgets, resulting in the need to make untenable, short-sighted decisions that perpetuate future crises.
Whenever a capable, trustworthy partner exists on the ground, the international community should not be constrained by short-term financial considerations. The world’s poorest countries should not be consigned to larger futures bills, social problems and insecurity because of a failure of leadership in global governance.
The international community’s inability to adequately address today’s problems stems primarily from two sources. One is short-sighted decision making due to financial constraints. The second is the ineffective structure of the U.N.S.C.
Here are a few suggestions to make the U.N. more responsive.
The inability of the U.N.S.C. to preventatively defuse conflicts, due to concerns over “national sovereignty”, condemns large groups of people to a future of conflict and economic decline. Conflict does not know national borders, leading to spillover conflicts that affect whole regions. Even once resolved, post-conflict countries are susceptible to sliding back into conflict. Taken together, these factors show why an inability to deal with one problem proactively can result in long-term instability for a whole region.
This issue gets to the root of the power struggle between the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. that champion human rights / democracy (U.S., Britain, France) and those champion national sovereignty (or more specifically, the ultimate supremacy of national sovereignty, even in instances where the Responsibility to Protect should clearly be invoked)–China and Russia.
Those opposed to “Western” values believe promoting “human rights” is just a way for America to impose its values abroad. I would contend human rights represent values that all people desire, by virtue of being human. Reforming the U.N.S.C. to give a General Assembly super-majority the power to overrule a U.N.S.C. veto would reveal which side of the argument is correct. I would bet the global majority would almost always land on the side of taking action to defend human dignity against any who would challenge it–terrorist or authoritarian ruler.
As the world’s largest military and a veto-possessing permanent member of the Security Council, America on the surface has the most to lose from such a reform. This is precisely why America must lead this push; if we champion this brave and uncertain approach, it would ultimately lead to a much more effective and timely defense of the very principles we hold dear. By loosening our grip on power, we would actually achieve our desired aims through a democratic process–what could be more American than that?
Human rights violations lead to revolution and conflict, during which legitimate opposition is branded “terrorism”. Inaction by the international community leads to “hurting stalemates” and power vacuums that are filled by opportunistic extremist groups. Authoritarian governments then become the more tenable option, and their “fighting terrorism” narrative becomes self-fulfilling (despite the fact that often their abusive actions led to the uprisings in the first place). Failure to reform means we are OK with this status-quo–we should not be.
During the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, many countries called for U.N.S.C. reform. When such disparate countries with differing needs use their moment in the global spotlight to promote this common cause, it is a message that should be taken very seriously.
2) Development Aid Smoothing
This is admittedly a less developed plan, as I am no financial economist. But it remains clear to me that the world needs some sort of mechanism to smooth development aid for the world’s Least Developed Countries.
We see it time and time again–poor countries slowly slide into worsening conflict or are devastated by predictable natural disasters because:
a) The LDCs do not have the resources or capacity to address these issues preventatively;
b) The international community cannot muster the funds, as they are all tied up in long-term humanitarian missions (likely because not enough resources were invested preventatively elsewhere–you can see why there is never a shortage of disasters, we ignore budding issues to address full blown ones. By the time those full-blown issues are under control, the ignored budding issues have festered into the new issue de jour).
The continued inability of the international community to address problems before they get worse is not only financially short-sighted, it is a failure of the U.N’s mandates and fuels the perception (and increasingly the reality) that international community is incapable of addressing the problems of the 21st century.
The European Refugee Crisis did not come out of nowhere. In fact, for anybody who follows international affairs, it is an inevitable result of a failure of leadership, shared responsibility, and vision in global security. For the past 70 years, America has been the guarantor of global security for countries seeking to promote democracy and human rights. For many decades this strategy either worked, or we lacked the communications technologies to know that it did not.
However, the decline of the inter-state war (thanks in large part to the economic interdependence and institutions engineered by America post-WWII) and rise of civil wars / non-state (terrorist) actors have led to much more protracted conflicts. The costs of modern warfare, exemplified by America’s “War on Terror”, have left America war-weary and financially strained–the era of “Team America, World Police” is over. This does not mean America should pull back from its extra-territorial human rights obligations, it means that countries that share our values must begin to pull their weight.
“Let us also remember: the high number of refugees and migrants are a symptom of deeper problems – endless conflict, grave violations of human rights, tangible governance failures and harsh repression. The Syrian war, for example, has just been manifested on a roadside in the heart of Europe.”
Mr. Ban said that in addition to upholding responsibilities, the international community must also show greater determination in resolving conflicts and other problems that leave people little choice but to flee. Failing that, the numbers of those displaced – more than 40,000 per day – will only rise.
“This is a human tragedy that requires a determined collective political response. It is a crisis of solidarity, not a crisis of numbers,” the Secretary-General declared.
Thomas Friedman, who is by no means a war hawk, had a surprisingly hawkish outlook on the wars of the Middle East and their subsequent refugee crises in his most recent NYT Op-Ed:
Since World War II, U.S. foreign policy has focused on integrating more countries into a democratic, free-market world community built on the rule of law while seeking to deter those states that resist from destabilizing the rest. This is what we know how to do.
But, argues Michael Mandelbaum, author of the forthcoming “Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era”: “There is nothing in our experience that has prepared us for what is going on now: the meltdown of an increasing number of states all at the same time in a globalized world
Your heart aches for the Syrian refugees flocking to Europe. And Germany’s generosity in absorbing so many is amazing. We have a special obligation to Libyan and Iraqi refugees. But, with so many countries melting down, just absorbing more and more refugees is not sustainable.
If we’re honest, we have only two ways to halt this refugee flood, and we don’t want to choose either:build a wall and isolate these regions of disorder, or occupy them with boots on the ground, crush the bad guys and build a new order based on real citizenship, a vast project that would take two generations. We fool ourselves that there is a sustainable, easy third way: just keep taking more refugees or create “no-fly zones” here or there.
Will the ends, will the means. And right now no one wants to will the means, because all you win is a bill. So the world of disorder keeps spilling over into the world of order. And beware: The market, Mother Nature and Moore’s law are just revving their engines. You haven’t seen this play before, which is why we have some hard new thinking and hard choices ahead.
Obviously the first option–isolating these regions of disorder–is not really an option at all. Pursuing this option would lead to untold human suffering and stifle innovation, trade, and economic growth. Furthermore, these regions of disorder will not simply leave us alone, as evidenced by 9/11, the 2004 Madrid Train bombings, and more recent “lone wolf” terrorist attacks around the world.
One of the great challenges of the 21st century for the global community, therefore, is to establish a fair, equitable, and financially sustainable system for promoting economic development, “positive peace“, and conflict prevention. The UN Security Council must be reformed, in order to allow the “Responsibility to Protect” to fulfill it’s promise and respond to conflicts in a decisive and timely manner.
The Syrian civil war is a case-in-point of what happens when the international community is unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources to stemming a conflict before it gets out of control.
There are many considerations when assessing the true cost of war, aside from the obvious financial cost of intervention and casualties. Other less obvious costs include damage to the “host” country (physical damage, lost economic output, the cost of post-conflict reconstruction) and psychological and human development costs to civilians in the “host” country–surely war is not to be rushed into or taken lightly.
But despite all these costs, the use of force must remain as a deterrent; war might be costly for society as a whole, but it can still be very profitable for authoritarian governments and terrorist groups. Given Europe’s relative wealth and proximity to the Middle East / North Africa, it’s role in global security and defending human rights abroad has been feeble. Germany is leading the European campaign to house refugees, but as Friedman and Ban point out, treating the symptom and not the cause is not a sustainable solution.
The U.S. more than does it’s part in fighting these wars, but despite good intentions our track record is far from perfect–both intervention and non-intervention in past decades have had disastrous effects. When the U.S. military is the only show in town, “debates” on the proper course of action devolve into an echo-chamber of American ideas, and any ensuing missteps–be they to act or not to act–are amplified.
One would hope that the daily influx of thousands of conflict-driven refugees, in addition to a resurgent Russian military, would kick the Europe military machine into gear. Failure to do so does not promote peace or fiscal responsibility, it is a short-sighted and cowardly approach to governance, and one the world cannot afford.
Turkey and the United States have agreed in general terms on a plan that envisions American warplanes, Syrian insurgents and Turkish forces working together to sweep Islamic State militants from a 60-mile-long strip of northern Syria along the Turkish border, American and Turkish officials say.
The plan would create what officials from both countries are calling an Islamic State-free zone controlled by relatively moderate Syrian insurgents, which the Turks say could also be a “safe zone” for displaced Syrians.
And with only 60 Syrian insurgents having been formally vetted and trained by the United States under a Pentagon program, questions also remain about which Syrian insurgents and how many will be involved in the new operation. A larger number of rebels that American officials deem relatively moderate have been trained in a covert C.I.A. program, but on the battlefield they are often enmeshed or working in concert with more hard-line Islamist insurgents.
Such Syrian Arab insurgents would gain at the expense of the People’s Protection Units, a Kurdish militia known by the initials Y.P.G. that is seeking to take the same territory from the east. While the United States views the group as one of its best partners on the ground, Turkey sees it as a threat; it is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a militant group whose longstanding conflict with Turkey has flared anew in recent days.
The plan does not envision Turkish ground troops entering Syria, although long-range artillery could be used across the border. Turkish ground forces would work on their side of the border to stem the Islamic State’s ability to infiltrate foreign fighters and supplies into Syria.
Awakening–an act or moment of becoming suddenly aware of something. Awakening is the word used to describe the coming together of disparate Sunni tribes and U.S. coalition forces to fight and defeat al Qeada in Iraq–the “Sunni Awakening”.
But there was another “awakening” for these factions–a rude awakening. After doing the heavy lifting on the front lines, these Sunni factions were largely shut-out of the political reunification of Iraq. This was not only unjust, it contributed to the government ineptitude and subsequent power-vacuum that has helped fuel ISIL’s rapid advance across Iraq.
There is a parallel in the fights against ISIS and Assad. This time, the YPG and PKK Kurdish forces are playing the front-line role. Furthermore, the Kurds are far more ideologically aligned with “Western values” than the Sunni Awakening tribes ever were.
My first thought when I heard Turkey was stepping up its fight against ISIS was “about time”. But my enthusiasm was quickly tempered as it became clear that Turkey’s plan is more about fighting the PKK and Turkish politics than the fights against ISIS and Assad. Turkey has the capacity to play a very important role in the fights against Assad and ISIL–this plan does not fulfill that role, and will likely be a net-negative.
The Kurdish pesh merga is a capable military with boots on the ground. Kurdish political leadership is stable and able to balance security and human rights better than any Middle-Eastern government aside from Turkey, Israel, and Tunisia. For a fraction of the financial and moral support sunk into failed ME regimes, Kurdistan could probably now be a fully functioning democratic state by now–I reiterate my support for an independent Kurdistan (although not on Turkish land, but in parts of Syria and Iraq).
For its part, Kurdish political leadership must denounce terrorist attacks against the Turkish government, and distance itself from any radical elements of their parties. Such terrorist attacks are counter productive–they cost the Kurdish statehood movement public support (which is a necessary element for ever becoming an internationally recognized state) and provide Turkey with legitimate reasons to attack Kurdish positions.
The Kurds should also expand their security mandate from solidifying their borders, to actively engaging and degrading ISIL. Backed by coalition airstrikes, boots on the ground are exactly what the fight against ISIL is most lacking. Despite war at it’s front door, Turkey will still not provide ground troops. The Kurds can use this cowardly position to their advantage, juxtaposing the importance of its ground troops against moderately useful Turkish air bases (yes they allow coalition airstrikes to get to positions faster, but without boots on the ground acting in concert with these airstrikes, they are largely ineffective in the fight against ISIL).
If the Turks want to stay out of the fight against ISIL and Assad, that is its prerogative as a sovereign nation. But the U.S. government and NATO should not sanction Turkey using this fight as a cover to degrade the one capable force on the ground fighting both ISIL and Assad. There is no longer a moderate Syrian opposition without the pesh merga. We should heed the lessons of abandoning our front-line allies after they have done “the dirty work” of war. The Kurds will not remain our allies if we abandon them at the first hint of Turkish intervention in the fight against ISIL.
(Update: In a further blow to the moderate Syrian rebels who figure so prominently in Turkey’s plan to fight ISIS and Assad, the leader of the only U.S. vetted force, Nadeem Hassan, was kidnapped along with 6 other rebels. This puts the number of vetted moderate Syrian rebels somewhere between 53 and 47, a reasonably large college lecture class, but not an army capable of fighting ISIS or Assad, regardless of the level of aerial support.)
Assad and ISIL cannot last indefinitely. The question is what morning-after do we want the Kurdish people to awaken to? The one where we stood by them as partners? Or the one where we gave the thumbs up for Turkey to bomb them after months of doing the world’s dirty work fighting ISIL?
Some countries are truly not ripe for democratic modernization–it is a process. Failure to realize this can lead to costly wars and greater instability than before said interventions started. This is not to say the international community cannot or should not use it’s intelligence and resources to identify and support the civil elements within a country that are laying the socioeconomic and ideological groundwork for future democratic movements–we should. But we must be realistic when considering our willingness to dedicate resources and our partners capacities when determining whether direct intervention is a pragmatic decision; moving too fast is as bad as not moving at all.
At the other end of the spectrum, failure to support movements that have the capacity to solidify universal aspirations of freedom into sustainable political infrastructure and government administration–such as Kurdish leadership–should not be an option either. Not only does this go against “Western values”, it is geopolitically short-sighted. Furthermore, continuing to make this mistake makes the “democracy cannot exist in the middle east” narrative self-fulfilling.
Greece’s negotiations with its creditors have not gone smoothly. The Greek government treated an interim deal reached in February as a starting point for negotiations, while it’s creditors considered it more of an non-negotiable outline of a deal. The result has been two sides talking past each other; the longer this situation persists, the more likely a “Grexit”–Greece leaving the Eurozone and / or EU–becomes.
There is a ton of middle ground for the two sides–both want Greece to return to growth and full employment. The Greek government also wants a safety-net for people negatively affected by labor market and other structural reforms; pushing already impoverished people further into poverty is not only morally reprehensible, it is bad economics.
To prevent this result, Greece has passed an “anti-poverty law” to protect its most vulnerable citizens. The problem is financing this program; the Greek government needs room to implement needed structural reforms without further destabilizing Greek society.
In addition to staving off a humanitarian crisis, Greece also needs a long-term growth strategy beyond structural reforms. There are few options for the Greek government:
1) It can completely comply with creditor demands.
2) It can continue to push its lenders for more fiscal space (smaller primary surplus and / or promises of greater EU level aid / debt relief).
3) It can default on its debts and exit the Eurozone.
The first option is a non-starter, as the Greek government feels current demands would exacerbate social and economic hardship in Greece.
The second option would allow Greece to leverage more public money for safety net programs, educational and workforce training programs, and public private partnerships. This would allow Greece to avoiding default while mapping out a plan to boost economic growth.
The last option would be painful in the short-run as Greece would get battered by financial markets and possibly have to deal with currency instability as it reintroduced the drachma(?), but it would open policy space and make Greece much more competitive in terms of cost of doing business. A Grexit could also lead to a domino effect–if other ailing E.U. countries see a post-E.U. Greece succeeding, it would bolster anti-E.U. parties within these countries.
Herman van Rompuy [former head of the European Council of EU leaders] told a Brussels conference that if Greece were to leave the euro zone, that would also have geopolitical repercussions in the current standoff with Russiaover Ukraine, emboldening Moscow to see Europe as weak.
Van Rompuy urged all sides to consider the political and geopolitical implications of such a step and not just the economic and financial arguments.
“I hope we will never have to answer the Grexit question,” he added
Greece staying in the E.U. is important for both sides of the negotiation. There are enough crises in the world without manufacturing one in Greece. It is exactly times like these when budgetary restrictions should be relaxed in the name of pragmatic, longer-term priorities. But so far Greece and it’s lenders have been unable to map out a solution that worksall parties involved, and so the current impasse and possibility of an “accidental Grexit” persists.
Greece did submit a new proposal to it’s creditors yesterday, and it was apparently strong enough that it got an unofficial endorsement from French Prime Minister Francois Hollande. This could be meaningful development, as heads of major European states have to this point been reluctant to acknowledge Greek concessions. It is a step towards the “political dialogue” Tsipras has been pleading for (framing the debate less in adversarial terms between debtor and creditor, and more as a mutual compromise between equal partners working towards a common goal).
“Democracy in Recession”
If Greece were to leave the EU, (aside from the economic impact) there would be significant geopolitical repercussions, including a Greek pivot towards Russia. The Greek government has already signaled it disagrees with EU sanctions on Russia. More recently, it was reported that Putin and Tsipras “did not discuss financial aid” on the sidelines of the St. Peteresburg International Economic Forum. Generally speaking, whenever someone has to defend that something “wasn’t discussed”, it means it either was discussed or very likely will be in the future.
This is not to say that Greece would stop being functioning as a democracy if it leaves the EU. In fact, it is a strong belief in democratic ideals that underpin the current standoff between Greece and it’s creditors. But a fracturing of the EU would certainly be a blow to the ideals the EU stands for–peace and prosperity through a cooperative, democratic international system. Specifically, if Greece signed a natural gas pipeline deal with Russia, it would undermine the current sanctions regime against Russia.
Even more alarmingly, Greece’s problems are emblematic of a greater inward shift by major democratic powers:
A recent NATO Poll found that “At least half of Germans, French and Italians say their country should not use military force to defend a NATO ally if attacked by Russia,” the Pew Research Center said it found in its survey, which is based on interviews in 10 nations.
In the United States, the study notes, support for NATO remains fairly strong. Americans and Canadians, it says, were the only nationalities surveyed in which more than half of those polled believed that their country should take military action if Russia attacked a NATO ally.
“…perhaps the most worrisome dimension of the democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence” in America and the West at large. After years of hyperpolarization, deadlock and corruption through campaign financing, the world’s leading democracy is increasingly dysfunctional, with government shutdowns and the inability to pass something as basic as a budget. “The world takes note of all this,” says Diamond. “Authoritarian state media gleefully publicize these travails of American democracy in order to discredit democracy in general and immunize authoritarian rule against U.S. pressure.”
Diamond urges democrats not to lose faith. Democracy, as Churchill noted, is still the worst form of government — except for all the others. And it still fires the imagination of people like no other system. But that will only stay true if the big democracies maintain a model worth following. I wish that were not so much in question today.
Look, I get it. The world is still emerging from a generational economic crisis. Democracies are first and foremost accountable to their electorates, and in the face of short-term problems it is difficult to sell the importance of dealing with seemingly longer-term issues. But this is what we should demand of our political leaders–the ability to meet peoples short term needs while simultaneously laying the groundwork for long-term peace and prosperity.
The Democratization Process
Modernization theory and recent history support the idea that sustained democratic movements must result from organic desire by local factions. When these natural movements towards democratic governance emerge, they must be nurtured.
Democratic movements are always opposed by those who stand to lose power should they succeed. If the primary champions of democracy (the U.S. and the E.U.) seem increasingly unwilling to provide the resources needed to defend those who share our values, democratic movements are less likely to take shape against adversaries that tend to have economic and military advantages.
Autocratic rulers have always used propoganda and media control to make democracy look less appealing. This job becomes easier when traditional democratic stalwarts appear unable to govern effectively at home, and unwilling to defend their ideals abroad.