A little more than a week before the Egyptian coup that resulted in the ouster of Egypt’s first democratically elected leader Mohamed Morsi, I went on the record as being critical of any non-democratic means of removing Morsi from office. At the time, and still today, defending Morsi certainly puts one on the less popular side of the debate:
I have written many times about the democratic experiment in Egypt here at NN. Egypt is an interesting country, it is the most populous country in the Middle-East, and has a long history of cooperation with Western powers (the U.S. funds the Egyptian military). Egypt’s armed forces will play a crucial role in preventing the Syrian Civil War from turning into a regional conflict (and in maintaining regional security in general). While Turkey is another example of an Islamic state attempting to reconcile democracy and traditional Islamic values, there is something about Egypt’s geographical position that makes it seem like a more robust test of the compatibility of the two ideologies (perhaps Turkey seems European-ized–it is actually seeking EU membership–which may isolate it from more conservative Muslim’s, whereas Egypt is in Africa, which could be more agreeable to those same factions).
For these reasons, alongside the human rights and modernization implications of effective democratic governance, I have been cheering Morsi on in his attempt to bring democracy to Egypt. Sometimes I have been too understanding; Morsi has made mistakes along the way, including targeted violations of the civil rights of his opponents in the name of national security / democracy. President Morsi has owned up to these mistakes, and now seems to have learned what it takes to lead an effective democracy.
Transparency, rule of law, accountability / anti-corruption, personal and societal security, an inclusive and participatory governing process, and the indiscriminate protection of human rights are among the most important aspects of an effective democracy. Morsi has (hopefully) learned that seeking to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime by violating these aspects of democracy, even in the name of national security, is counter-productive. Self-defense is fine, but short of that the opposition must be allowed to assemble. In a religious dictatorship the opposition are terrorists / saboteurs / infidels; in an effective democracy they are simply the opposing political party (again, so long as they use political and not military means to advance their goals).
President Morsi has proposed national reconciliation efforts, including making amendments to the constitution (which was open for vote to begin with, the opposition simply refused to participate). He has also proposed the opposition take part in parliamentary elections. Judicial independence has been tricky, as many of the judges in Egypt were assigned under former dictator Hosni Mubarak (packing the courts with his own judges would not ease concerns of a Morsi power-grab either; anyone he appoints, regardless of his background, would be seen by his opponents only as a “Morsi appointee”. Nevertheless, Morsi has offered basically every legitimate democratic avenue available to address the concerns of his opposition.
The opposition, on the other hand, has refused to take part in the democratic process. It will be satisfied with nothing short of Morsi’s removal from office, calling for early presidential elections. Is that any way to establish the credibility of a brand new democratic process, by tossing that process aside instead of trying to work within it? Early elections would undermine the future of democracy in Egypt by setting a bad precedent.
A week after that blog, the Egyptian military gave Morsi a 48 hour deadline before they would step in and remove him from power–and then made good on that threat
I had this to say in reaction to the coup:
General Asis, by giving Morsi a 48 hour period to negotiate, had already made up its mind about overthrowing Egypt’s first democratically elected leader. 48 hours is not enough time to make meaningful progress on negotiations— all such an unrealistic time frame did was further entrench the opposition’s position to refuse to come to the negotiating table.
Give Morsi 6 months, or a year; an amount of time that allow the opposition to prove its legitimacy, and do something other than stand on its head and watch fireworks and light shows. So far all the opposition has shown is extreme, borderline irrational hatred for Morsi (and the Brotherhood, a hatred that has included decades or persecution under the Mubarak regime) and the inability to participate in the democratic process. Why should we believe that now democracy will work in Egypt?
The Military missed a golden opportunity to play arbiter between Morsi and the opposition, upholding both the principles of democratic institutions while also ensuring an inclusive agenda setting and policy making process consistent with international human rights norms. Instead the coup undermines the very ability of democracy to take root in Egypt, and creates far more questions than provides answers.
It was encouraging to see diverse interests standing alongside General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. However, the shutting down of Muslim Brotherhood news stations and arrests / killings of Morsi supporters paints a grim picture for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. What bothers me is what will happen to those not in the meetings mapping out Egypt’s future–namely the Muslim Brotherhood. Suspensions of freedoms of expression and media independence are also alarming, and make for an unstable basis on which to build a new democracy.
How the new government and the Muslim Brotherhood interacts will determine the ability of Egypt to move forward as a cohesive and peaceful democratic society. If the Brotherhood reacts violently, Egypt may be mired in civil violence for years to come. Only if the Muslim Brotherhood and opposition embrace one-another (admittedly a long shot, at least right away, and one that would require significant political and diplomatic maneuvering) can the new government truly represent all factions of Egyptian society. A modernized Egypt that treats Muslims Brotherhood members as second class citizens can never be a true democracy.
I think the coup came down to Egyptians needing a scapegoat, and Morsi’s regime being in the right place at the right time. Nobody in Egypt wants to admit there are structural economic issues; popular fuel subsidies are unsustainable and large investments need to be made in Egypt’s infrastructure and public services. High unemployment, inflation, and insecurity depress economic output and create a basis for anti-establishment behavior. Egyptians want a President who will tell them they can have their cake and eat it too; perhaps this new coalition government will be able to deliver if they are able to secure a loan from an alternative source without IMF preconditions. I for one do not see where that funding could come from.
Sooner or later difficult fiscal decisions are going to have to be made in Egypt, and not everyone is going to be happy. Are they going to overthrow the next president too? I just do not like the precedent that was set–perhaps I am being idealistic instead of pragmatic. It may be that a stronger democracy comes from this military coup, we will have to wait and find out.
Since these events took place, many of the questions that arose from the Egyptian military coup have answered themselves (an excellent analysis of the events leading up to and since Morsi’s ouster was compiled compliments of Reuters). The Brotherhood has not embraced the armies calls for an inclusive road-map to an effective and pluralistic democracy. Instead, they have elected to continue mostly non-violent protests against the Egypt’s interim government which they refuse to recognize as legitimate.
The interim government’s Cabinet was established without a single Brotherhood member, but it did include military head General Sisi as first deputy Prime Minister. Media outlets that appear to be understanding of the Brotherhood’s dismay have been shut down, including Al-Jazeera’s Cairo branch. Fifty plus Morsi supporters were massacred during prayer where Morsi is believed to be held–ensuing investigations have been not into military conduct (of course not–in Egypt the military is above the law), but against Brotherhood leaders for inciting protests.
Throwing salt on the Bortherhood’s wounds (and fuel on the protester fire), Morsi was recently charged with espionage and murder in connection to his escape from jail in 2011. Morsi was a prisoner of former dictator Hosni Mubarak–charging him for a crime against a popularly disposed dictator seems to run against the armies stated goals.
The U.S. government will continue to provide military aid to Egypt, exonerating itself from taking a stand on exactly what happened in Egypt (although it has rightfully called for Egypt’s new leaders to release Morsi from jail):
The senior official did not describe the legal reasoning behind the finding, saying only, “The law does not require us to make a formal determination as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to make such a determination.”
“We will not say it was a coup, we will not say it was not a coup, we will just not say,” the official said.
The alternative source of funding I could not foresee came through from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to the tune of $12 billion in oil products, foreign reserves, and loans / grants. All three of these countries are monarchies, making interesting bedfellows for a country attempting to establish effective and pluralistic democracy. This will allow the Egyptian government to delay cuts to popular subsidies, a precondition for an IMF loan:
“The interim cabinet, chosen this week after the military ousted Islamist President Mohamed Mursi, will probably avoid politically risky reforms of the budget such as cutting the subsidies on which Egypt’s millions of poor depend.
Instead the new cabinet which includes many technocrats and experienced administrators will try to buy social peace with billions of dollars of foreign aid, offered largely by wealthy Gulf Arab states.”
“If the strategy to boost growth fails, the next elected government could take office facing an even bigger cash crunch, forcing it into unpopular decisions early on.
“The concern is that once there is some more permanent government, it will inherit an even bigger economic mess than the one the Mursi administration had,” said Said Hirsh, an economist with London-based consulting firm Volterra Partners.”
Is Egypt spiraling into or out of control? I suppose the answer you receive to that question would depend on who you ask. Ask a Morsi opponent, and he will tell you that the Morsi regime was little more than an illegitimate power-grab. Ask a Morsi supporter and they will tell you Morsi’s failures were due to the “deep state” (military, police, judiciary) and a refusal of his opponents to embrace the democratic process, undermining his rule.
So instead lets look at the indisputable facts. Sectarian divides are stronger now than they were when Mubarak fell–did the coup avert a civil war, or lay the foundation for civil conflict? Human rights are not being upheld in an indiscriminate way, as anybody that supports Morsi may be silenced with impunity by the military (either by having media outlets shut down / being arrested / or killed). A larger budget deficit is all but certain for Egypt’s next democratically elected government.
In Egypt, as long as the army has a popular mandate (or what it deems a popular mandate), it can act with impunity. Human rights violations, unsustainable fiscal policy and government deficits, media censorship, and lack of accountability from the military are week pillars to build democracy on.
Having said all this, there does seem to be a legitimacy with the new Egyptian coalition government; it has said all the right things and seems to back the will of Egypt’s pluralistic civil society. But actions speak louder than words, and the actions of Egypt’s military and interim government–combined with The Muslim Brotherhoods determination to play spoiler in Egypt’s second attempt at democratization–does not bode well for the implementation of Egypts “road-map to democracy”.
If the strategy to boost growth fails, the next elected government could take office facing an even bigger cash crunch, forcing it into unpopular decisions early on.
“The concern is that once there is some more permanent government, it will inherit an even bigger economic mess than the one the Mursi administration had,” said Said Hirsh, an economist with London-based consulting firm Volterra Partners.
Oh boy, it’s looking bad for the Brotherhood and Egyptian democracy:
“The Egyptian authorities unleashed a ferocious attack on Islamist protesters early Saturday, killing at least 65 people in the second mass killing of demonstrators in three weeks and the deadliest attack by the security services since Egypt’s uprising in early 2011.
The attack provided further evidence that Egypt’s security establishment was reasserting its dominance after President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster three weeks ago, and widening its crackdown on his allies in the Muslim Brotherhood. The tactics — some victims were killed with single gunshot wounds to the head — suggested that Egypt’s security services felt no need to show any restraint.”
“In a televised news conference hours after the clash, Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim absolved his men of any responsibility and made no mention of the high death toll. His officers, he said, ‘have never and will never shoot a bullet on any Egyptian.'”
In Egypt, it appears the military is the judge, jury, and executioner, as well as the President, PM, Cabinet….
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